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INTRODUCTION 
 
The political tension between Turkey and the United States which 
started with the US decision to go for a regime change in Iraq through 
military force, peaked on March 1, 2003.  On that day, the Turkish 
parliament rejected the deployment of American troops on Turkish territory, 
thus blocked the opening of the northern front.  For many analysts, March 1 
has been considered a breaking point in the history of Turkish-US relations.  
The fact that on such a critical issue, Turkey turned its back on the United 
States, its most powerful ally-inevitably damaged the relations.  What is of 
more significance, was the fact that behind Turkey’s decision lied its 
resentment and mistrust towards US policies towards Iraq that has been in 
place for over a decade.  The political outcome on March 1 seriously 
conflicted with the substance of “strategic partnership” between the United 
States and Turkey which the Turkish policy makers commonly used to 
define bilateral relations with an emphasis on their compatible interests.   
This study aims to offer an analysis of Turkish-American relations 
with a focus on the impact of March 1 resolution by making an assessment 
of what went wrong during and after negotiations, what the rejection of the 
resolution meant for the parties, and what lessons can be drawn to avoid a 
similar crisis in the future.  There have been so many speculations on 
“March 1 incident.  Was this accident a last minute road accident since the 
majority of the Turkish parliamentarians voted in favor of the resolution, yet 
the motion failed for technical reasons?  To some commentators, the reasons 
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for this political outcome laid in the Justice and Development Party’s (AKP) 
political inexperience and its lack of party discipline.  In contrast, some 
analysts suggested that the AKP was actually ambivalent about cooperating 
with the US against Iraq, while others claimed that it was the Turkish 
General Staff which blocked the government’s efforts to pass the resolution.  
This study aims to show that the resolution was doomed to failure because 
of Turkey’s overriding concerns about a military operation against Iraq.  
Moreover, it claims that the reasons undermining the US–Turkish 
cooperation against Iraq actually predated the resolution crisis.   
Iraq has been a controversial subject between Turkey and the United 
States in which the allies differed in their political priorities and threat 
perceptions.  For Turkey, the Gulf War in 1990, particularly the 
establishment of safe havens through Operation Provide Comfort (OPC), 
created a “Northern Iraq” problem which has occupied a significant place in 
Turkish foreign policy since then.  The political developments in the post-
Gulf War period caused discontent among the Turks towards US policies on 
Iraq; at the same time led Turkey to shape its foreign policy through the 
prism of its Kurdish problem.  In this context, Turkey’s primary concern has 
been the emergence of a de facto Kurdish state in northern Iraq believing 
that it might incite separatist tendencies among the Kurds in Turkey.  
Therefore, since the Gulf War, Turkey has been in favor of protecting the 
territorial integrity of Iraq in order to prevent the establishment of an 
independent Kurdish entity in northern Iraq. 
However, the picture was perceived quite differently by the United 
States.  When the United States looked at Iraq, there appeared an oppressive 
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regime which brutalized its own people and posed a threat to world security 
by seeking weapons of mass destruction (WMD).  Especially in the 
September 11 context, the world’s only superpower declared a war against 
terrorists and “rogue states” which harbored terrorists.  It was not surprising 
that Iraq topped the list of these rogue states, given Saddam Hussein’s 
dictatorial rule and his non-compliance with the United Nations (UN) 
sanctions regime.  Therefore, the US political priority over Iraq was to get 
rid of the Saddam regime and replace it with a friendly government.  
Although the dissolution of Iraq was not a desirable outcome by the US 
policy makers considering the possibility of chaos and even an ethnic civil 
war, a federal political arrangement in Iraq might well serve the US political 
interests as long as there emerged a relatively democratic and stable 
government. 
From this perspective, March 1 highlighted the conflict of interests 
between a revolutionary world hegemon and a pro-status quo power.  For 
the Bush administration, Saddam regime was the main source of conflict 
and thus a regime change through a military force appeared as the only 
viable option.  In contrast, Turkey was opposed to any kind of regime 
change in Iraq, fearing that a regime change could lead to political 
fragmentation and pave the way for the emergence of an independent 
Kurdistan in northern Iraq.  By presenting an analysis of the economic and 
political impact of the Gulf War in 1990 as well as the political process on 
the road to March 1 this study intends to provide evidence for Turkey’s 
visible opposition to the US intention of altering the status quo in the region.  
In the meantime, Turkish-American relations will be examined from a 
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historical perspective so as to better determine the place (and impact) of the 
March 1 incident in bilateral relations and compare it with similar crises that 
took place in the past.  By placing the relations in a broader context, this 
study aims to provide a better understanding of the evolution of Turkish-
American alliance parallel to structural and conjunctural changes in the 
political environment. 
 Turkish-American relations will be studied under four chapters: 
Chapter I The origins and the evolution of Turkish-American 
relations (1945-1990) 
Chapter II The post-Cold War era: The Shaping of a new type of 
relations (1990-2001) 
Chapter III Turkish-American relations in the September 11 context: 
From Afghanistan to Iraq 
Chapter IV The Analysis of March 1 resolution 
 
Chapter One will focus on the formation of Turkish-American 
alliance and the development of bilateral relations on a security axis against 
the Soviet expansion throughout the Cold War.  Chapter Two will analyze 
the emergence of a strategic partnership between the United States and 
Turkey with the Gulf War, following the collapse of the Soviet Union.  
Chapter Three will discuss Turkish-American relations in the September 11 
context, addressing the changing security paradigms in the US foreign 
policy making as well as Turkey’s increasing significance for the United 
States as a model to be promoted in the Middle East.  This chapter also 
examines what has happened between the United States and Turkey from 
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the War in Afghanistan to Iraq.  Chapter Four, aims to provide an analysis 
of the March 1 incident with its political, military and social dimensions.   
The focus will be on the negotiation process, concentrating on the 
diplomatic failures, misunderstandings, and political miscalculations of both 
sides. 
As for the literature on Turkish-American relations, there are quite a 
number of sources on the evolution of bilateral relations during the Cold 
War period.  Among these, George Harris’ Troubled Alliance: Turkish-
American Problems in Historical Perspective, 1947-1971, again his 
Turkish-American relations since Truman doctrine and George McGhee’s 
The United States-Turkey and the Middle East Connection can be given.  
These works provide an insight for the formation and evolution of the 
relations within the Cold War paradigms while concentrate on the 
problematic foreign policy issues of the era such as the Cuban Missile Crisis 
or the Cyprus question.  As for a relatively neglected period of 1800-1952, 
Şuhnaz Yılmaz’s unpublished PhD dissertation “From Strangers to Allies: 
Turkish-American Relations,” is a valuable source with its extensive use of 
archival works from the Turkish Foreign Ministry.  She offers a 
comprehensive study on the formation of bilateral relations by going back to 
the late Ottoman era.  There are also many valuable sources on Turkish-
American alliance which examine bilateral relations with a focus on Turkish 
foreign policy.  To name a few examples, Baskın Oran’s, Türk Dış 
Politikası I-II offers an analysis of the evolution of Turkish-American 
relations both during and after the Cold War period, by underlining Turkish-
US cooperation in the NATO alliance.  Again, Oral Sander’s Türkiye’nin 
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Dış Politikası studies change and continuity in the Turkish-US relations 
while questions Turkey’s geopolitical importance for the United States 
throughout the Cold War.  
There is a comparatively developed body of literature on the 
Turkish-American relations for the post-Cold War period.  Most of the 
works focus on the changing security parameters and point at the potential 
between Turkey and the United States to develop cooperation on a number 
of areas such as energy transportation, democratization in the Caucasus, 
preserving peace and stability in  the Middle East and the Balkans.  Sources 
like Sabri Sayarı’s “Turkish-American relations in the Post-Cold War Era: 
Issues of Convergence and Divergence,” Morton Abramowitz’s (ed.), 
Turkey’s Transformation and American Policy  and Heinz Kramer’s Avrupa 
ve Amerika Karşısında Değişen Türkiye concentrate directly on the impact 
of the end of Cold War over the alliance ties.  On the other hand, Stephen F. 
Larrabee and Ian O. Lesser’s Turkish Foreign Policy in an Age of 
Uncertainty, and Barry Rubin and Kemal Kirişci’s (eds.), Turkey in World 
Politics: An Emerging Multiregional Power provide an assessment of 
Turkey’s changing role and significance in the post-Cold War context with 
reference to a debated “new activism” in the Turkish foreign policy.  
 
There are fewer works on the March 1 crisis since the topic remains 
quite new.  This field is mostly dominated by Turkish journalists who have 
access to the bureaucratic channels of Ankara and therefore have the 
opportunity to reflect what has happened on the road to March 1 the behind 
the scenes.  Murat Yetkin’s Tezkere: Irak Krizinin Gerçek Öyküsü and 
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Fikret Bila’s Sivil Darbe Girişimi ve Ankara’da Irak Savaşları can be 
counted among the most comprehensive works on this subject.  While Bila 
offers an analysis of the Turkish-US tension over Iraq by going back to the 
period under Bülent Ecevit’s leadership, in early 2002, Yetkin provides a 
detailed account of the negotiation process as well as a general outlook of 
the bilateral relations in the aftermath the resolution crisis.  On the other 
hand,  Mark Parris’ Allergic Partners: Can Relations be Saved and Michael 
Rubin’s A Comedy of Errors are also useful since they present a US 
perspective on March 1 incident and  discuss ways to restore a healthy 
dialogue between Turkey and the United States. 
As stated in the US National Security Strategy (NSS) of 2006, the 
United States, the world’s superpower “is at war” and “seeking to shape the 
world.”  With reference to the war on terror, the United States is determined 
to continue promoting freedom, stability, and peace in the world.  However, 
to achieve these goals, the Bush administration stressed that the US needs 
strong alliances, friendships, as well as support of the international 
institutions.  From a geopolitical perspective, Turkey remains at the regional 
crossroads of the US strategic interests and will be directly influenced by 
the transformative US policies in the region.  With regard to over sixty years 
of security ties between Turkey and the United States, the two countries are 
to benefit from cooperation rather than confrontation.  However, the Middle 
East and Iraq appear as problematic areas to build partnership upon as this 
study tries to emphasize. 
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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
This study offers an analysis of Turkish-American relations with a 
focus on the March 1 resolution.  It aims to provide a better understanding 
of the reasons which undermined Turkish-American cooperation against 
Iraq and resulted in Turkey’s rejection of the motion on March 1.  On the 
one hand, this study claims that the Iraq has been a problematic area for the 
US-Turkish cooperation and the roots of these problems actually predated 
March 1.  On the other hand, it concentrates on the mishandling of the 
negotiation process by the US-Turkish political elites towards the Iraq War, 
and its impact on bilateral relations.  This study aims to situate March 1 
incident in a broader context of alliance ties, and therefore presents an 
examination of Turkish-American relations from 1945 to 2003.  With an 
analysis of the evolution of Turkish-American alliance parallel to systemic 
and structural changes in the political realm, this study aims to provide a 
further insight into the relations under the shadow of March 1 resolution. 
 
 
 
KISA ÖZET 
 
 
 
Bu çalışma Türk-Amerikan ilişkilerinin 1 Mart tezkeresi odaklı bir 
analizidir.  1 Mart’ta Türkiye’nin ABD askerlerinin Türk topraklarına 
konuşlandırılmasına izin veren tezkereyi reddetmesiyle darbe alan Türk-
Amerikan ilişkilerine tarihsel bir perspektiften yaklaşarak krizin kapsamlı 
bir incelemesini sunmayı amaçlamaktadır.  Bu araştırma, bir yandan 
Türkiye ve Amerika arasında Irak üzerinden işbirliği kurmanın sorunlu 
olduğu ve bu sorunların kaynağının 1 Mart’tan çok evvele dayandığını 
savunmaktadır. Diğer bir yandan, Bush yönetiminin Irak’ta rejim 
değişikliğine gitme kararını Türk siyasi elitlerine iletmesini takiben, 1 
Mart’a giden sürecin Türk ve ABD’li siyasi elitler tarafından doğru şekilde 
yönetilememiş olmasının ilişkiler üzerindeki etkisini tartışmaktadır.   
Bu çalışma ayni zamanda 1 Mart krizinin yeri ve öneminin daha iyi 
tanımlanabilmesi ve geçmişteki benzer krizlerle kıyaslanabilmesi amacıyla, 
Türk-Amerikan ilişkilerinin 1945’ten 2003’e dek tarihsel gelişimini 
sunmaktadır.  Bu şekilde müttefiklik ilişkilerinin uluslararası sistemin  ve 
yapısal unsurların değişimine paralel olarak geçirdiği değişimi anlamak ve 1 
martta gelinen noktayı daha iyi şekilde anlamlandırmak mümkün olacaktır. 
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CHAPTER I 
THE ORIGINS AND THE EVOLUTION OF TURKISH-
AMERICAN RELATIONS 
With the end of World War II, a new international order emerged 
based on the confrontation of two superpowers, the United States and the 
Soviet Union.  As Winston Churchill, the former British prime minister 
declared in March, 1946, “the iron curtain” which descended across the 
continent paved the way for the informal partition of liberated Europe into 
pro-Western and pro-Soviet spheres.1  Each of the two zones was to adopt 
political institutions, economic practices, and foreign policies that reflected 
the preferences and influences of its liberator. 
One of the consequences of the Second World War was the collapse 
of Pax Britannica.  Owing to the post-war economic difficulties, Great 
Britain had to abandon her traditional role as the guarantor of Russia’s 
confinement along Eurasia and gradually decreased her military presence 
overseas.2  In order to prevent Soviet expansion, the United States filled in 
the power vacuum left by Great Britain in the Eastern Mediterranean and the 
Middle East, and undertook the responsibility of economic and political 
development of the region.  
                                                
1In a speech at Foulton Missouri, Winston Churchill declared: “From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the 
Adriatic, an iron curtain descended across the continent.”  See, Birdsall S. Viault, Modern European History, 
(McGraw Hill, 1990): 502. 
2
 On February 21, 1947, the British Foreign Office officially informed the American State Department of its 
intention to terminate all financial assistance to Greece and Turkey and to remove 40,000 British troops from 
Greece on account of Britain’s own economic crisis.  See, William R. Keylor, The Twentieth-Century World 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1996): 260. 
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Following 1945, a series of political developments raised concern 
among the Western powers over the limit and the scope of Soviet ambitions 
and forced them to take action against further Soviet expansion.  The 
Communist controlled Tudeh party coming to power in Azerbaijan (then the 
northern Iran) by a separatist revolt, the Iranian parliament’s agreement on 
Azerbaijan’s autonomy and joint oil venture with the Soviets, the Soviet 
demands from Turkey over the Straits and the Eastern provinces, along with 
the Greek Communist insurgency were perceived as consequent steps 
towards reviving the old Soviet ambitions- reaching the Mediterranean.3 
In February 1946, the long telegram sent by George F. Kennan from 
the US embassy in Moscow constituted a warning for the US officials 
against Soviet intentions and capacity, thus provided the impetus for the US 
political elites to follow a more active policy against the Soviets.  This 
telegram which was published in Foreign Affairs in July 1947 under the pen 
name of X emphasized the necessity of containing the Soviets rather than 
compromising with them.  Kennan suggested that the United States should 
follow “a policy of firm containment, designed to confront the Russians 
with unalterable counterforce at every point.”4  Considering the worrisome 
developments in Eurasia, President Truman declared a speech in March, 
1947 which underlined the US determination “to support free peoples who 
are resisting subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.”5  
This presidential declaration which later acquired the designation “Truman 
Doctrine” promised to provide economic resources to support friendly 
                                                
3
 See, William R. Keylor, The Twentieth-Century World (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996): 256. 
 
4
 See, George F. Kennan, “The Sources of Soviet Conduct” in Fareed Zakaria and James F. Jr. Hoqe, The 
American encounter (Basic Books, 1998).  
5
 See, William R. Keylor, The Twentieth-Century World (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), p.261. 
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nations under Soviet pressure or those facing a communist infiltration.  
Accordingly, on April, 3, 1948, the US Congress agreed on Marshall Plan, a 
$13 billion program for the reconstruction of the postwar international 
economic order, aiming at “reconstituting independent centers of power that 
would balance the Soviet Union.”6  
The Turkish American relations evolved in this Cold war context, 
based on common security concerns, containing Soviet expansion in 
particular and changed its course throughout the Cold war as a result of 
changes within the East-West tension.  For a newly founded republic with a 
devastated postwar economy, threatened by the territorial demands of a 
neighboring superpower, it was essential to maintain close relations with the 
United States and the Western camp.  Already in 1945, Moscow had 
denounced the Turkish-Soviet treaty of friendship, concluded in 1925.  On 
June 7, 1945, at the meeting between Foreign Commissar Molotov and the 
Turkish ambassador to Moscow, Russian demands were laid on the table 
including the cession of territory in the Caucasus annexed by Russia in 1878 
and the revision of Montreux Convention of 1936.  The Soviets were 
proposing a joint control over the Straits and the opening of Soviet bases for 
defense purposes.7  In this context, the arrival of the battleship Missouri to 
                                                
6
 Cited in John Lewis Gaddis, We now know: Rethinking Cold War History (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1998): 197; For the amount of the economic aid under the Marshall Plan see, Şuhnaz Yılmaz, “From 
Strangers to Allies: Turkish-American Relations,” Unpublished PhD Dissertation, (Princeton University, 
1999):192. 
7The Soviet demands concerning the Montreux Convention were presented earlier at the Potsdam conference 
where Stalin complained that the Montreux Convention did not comply with the changing realities of the 
international situation considering the militarily weak conditions of Turkey at the time.  Therefore he insisted on 
revising the Convention and obtaining bases in the vicinity of the Straits.  For the text of document presenting 
Soviet demands over the Straits see, FRUS: The Conference of Berlin, 1945, (vol. II):1427, in Şuhnaz Yılmaz, 
“From Strangers to Allies: Turkish-American Relations,” Unpublished PhD Dissertation, (Princeton University, 
1999):182, endnote 79. 
For the  Telegram to Ambassador Sarper from Turkish Foreign Ministry, July 12, 1945, see İkinci Dünya Savaşı 
Yılları  (Dışişleri Bakanlığı Yayınları: Ankara, 1973): 267 in  Şuhnaz Yılmaz, “From Strangers to Allies: 
  16 
Istanbul was more than a symbolic visit for the Turks; it was a proof of US 
determination to back Turkey against the Soviet threat.  Likewise, it was a 
great relief for Turkish people when Washington responded to the Soviet 
note of August 7, 1946, reiterating their claims over the Straits, by sending a 
naval force to the eastern Mediterranean.  Following this demonstrative 
show of force by the US navy, on September 30, 1946, Washington 
announced that a portion of the American fleet would be permanently 
stationed there8.  In this sense, the remarks made by President İnönü over 
the visit of Missouri: “The closer the ships of American navy to us, the 
better” reflected the desirability of US support to overcome Turkey’s 
political insecurity.9 
However, Turkish-American relations gained momentum with the 
proclamation of Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan.  In this process, 
the friendship between the US and Turkey turned into a formal alliance with 
Turkey’s NATO membership in 1952.  In fact, the US policymakers were 
divided over the idea of extending military assistance to Turkey.  As Feroz 
Ahmad indicates, the Pentagon regarded Turkey as a key country in the US 
Cold War strategy and therefore was in favor of the policy of providing 
military aid to Turkey.10  In contrast, the US officials from the State 
Department such as the Secretary of State Dean Acheson and George 
Kennan, believed that Turkey did not face an imminent threat from the 
                                                                                                                                                   
Turkish-American Relations,” Unpublished PhD Dissertation, (Princeton University, 1999): 182, endnote 77.      
See also, William R. Keylor, The Twentieth-Century World (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996): 257. 
8
 See, William R. Keylor, The Twentieth-Century World (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996): 258. 
9
 For a similar view and to read on the comments of the Turkish press over the visit of Missouri see also, Yılmaz, 
Şuhnaz, “From Strangers to Allies: Turkish-American Relations,” Unpublished PhD Dissertation, (Princeton 
University, 1999): 185-86. 
10
 Feroz Ahmad, “The Historical Background of Turkey’s Foreign Policy,” in Lenore G. Martin and Dimitris 
Keridis, The Future of Turkish Foreign Policy (MIT Press, 2004): 28- 30. 
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Soviets nor was it living through a financial collapse.11 Yet, the US 
policymakers agreed on the fact that communist take over of Turkey 
constituted a serious threat for the flank states like Greece.12  Therefore, 
Turkey assumed a strategic role in the containment of the Soviets, serving as 
a buffer state against Soviet expansion. 
Nevertheless, Turkey struggled to get involved within the Marshall 
Plan and to become a NATO member, yet eventually succeeded in   
convincing Western powers and the US that (under the burden of sharing 
borders with the Soviet Union,) keeping her economy and military intact 
was crucial to stand up against the communist threat.  In this context, the 
Korean War was regarded by the Turkish political elites as a test for Turkish 
solidarity for the US in this fight against communism.  Therefore, the 
dispatch of Turkish troops to Korean War was believed to have paved the 
way for Turkey’s NATO membership in 1952.  
As George Harris indicates, Turkey’s entry into NATO in February 
1952 marked a major advance in Turkish-American relations.13  The 
bilateral relations developed on a security basis in which Turkey obtained 
from the US economic aids to reinforce her military and economic 
modernization and in response provided bases for the US power projection.  
                                                
11
 Ibid. 
12
 On the other hand, Franz Schurmann argued that, Turkey received economic assistance for military 
modernization under the Truman doctrine mostly because of British concern over Greece.  The British advised 
the US that the communist take over of Greece would have a domino effect in the region.  See, Franz 
Schurmann, The Logic of World Power: An Inquiry Into the Origins, Currents, and Contradictions of World 
Politics (Pantheon Books, 1974). 
13
 George Harris, “Turkish-American relations since Truman doctrine” in Mustafa Aydın and Çağrı Erhan 
(eds.), Turkish-American Relations: Past, Present and Future (London and New York: Routledge, 2004): 68-69. 
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In the following years 1954-1962 Turkey received $ 867.500.000 as 
economic aid and $ 1.550.000 for the military.14 
While Turkey’s NATO membership signified the realization of a 
political ideal-becoming a member of the Western world- as one of 
Atatürk’s principles, Ankara perceived NATO as an extension of America 
and NATO membership as an opportunity to collaborate with the United 
States.15  However, this point of view misled Turkish political elites to reach 
a conclusion that Turkish and American interests were entirely congruent as 
Harris states.16  On the other hand, Baskin Oran argues that following an 
American oriented foreign policy in the 1950s was the political preference 
of the Turkish political elites, hoping that their cooperation would 
automatically result in economic aid.17  In this respect, Turkey had taken 
bold political steps to prove herself as a faithful ally of the US (despite the 
harsh criticisms at home for having sacrificed Turkish national interests in 
the long term for the sake of pleasing the Americans).18  Subsequently, 
                                                
14
 Baskın Oran (ed.), Türk Dış Politikası I-II (İstanbul: İletişim Yayıncılık, 2001). 
15Oral Sander provides an insight for the Turkish-American rapprochement after the World War II with respect 
to Atatürk’s legacy of westernization, geopolitics of Turkey as well as international dynamics of the period.  See, 
Oral Sander, Türkiye’nin Dış Politikası (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, 1994): 71. 
16
 George Harris, “Turkish-American relations since Truman doctrine” in Mustafa Aydın and Çağrı Erhan (eds.), 
Turkish-American Relations: Past, Present and Future (London and New York: Routledge, 2004): 68-69. 
17
 Baskın Oran argues that the US economic aid to Turkey following the Marshall plan has resulted in Turkey’s 
economic over dependency on the United States .As a condition to the given economic aid, the United States was 
determining the scope and deciding on which sectors the aid could be used.  Therefore; the United States became 
the target of criticism for preventing the development of Turkish industrial sectors.  By following an active and 
pro-American foreign policy contrary to the Kemalist principles of the traditional Turkish foreign policy -in 
favor of status quo and neutrality- the political elites hoped to obtain more credits so that they could finance their 
budget deficits.  When the economic support did not live up to their expectations, they looked for other sources 
and even approached to the Soviets for investment as the Menderes government and later as the Justice Party did.  
See, Baskın Oran(ed.), Türk Dış Politikası I-II (İstanbul: İletişim Yayıncılık, 2001) :496- 498; 552-555; 560.  
See also, George Harris, “Turkish-American relations since Truman doctrine” in Mustafa Aydın and Çağrı Erhan 
(eds.), Turkish-American Relations: Past, Present and Future (London and New York: Routledge, 2004): 69. 
Also, Feroz Ahmad, Turkey: A Quest for Identity (Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 2003): 113-115. 
18
 Accordingly, both the Republican People’s Party (RPP) and the Democrat Party (DP) have been criticized for 
having betrayed Kemalism.  The political developments such as accepting the Truman doctrine, the Marshall 
plan, joining NATO and the Baghdad Pact were all considered as political maneuvers to make Turkey an 
appendage of the West.  The nationalists and the Leftists began calling for a non-aligned Turkey and suggested 
that such policies against the national interests had to be abandoned.  For the anti-American debates in the 
  19 
Turkey formally recognized Israel in 1949 as the first Muslim country, 
participated in the Baghdad Pact, and allowed the use of her military bases 
for the US reconnaissance flights over the Soviet Union.19  What’s more 
Turkey was one of the three countries beside Great Britain and Italy which 
approved the deployment of Jupiter missiles on her soil.  This secret 
arrangement which left Turkey vulnerable to a Soviet attack was revealed 
by the Cuban missile crisis in 1962.20 
 In 1962, Cuban missile crisis not only disclosed the presence of 
Jupiter missiles in Turkey but also brought to light the political bargaining 
between the Soviets and the US over Turkey’s security establishments.  In 
order to prevent a nuclear war with the US, the Soviets agreed to dismantle 
their missiles from Cuba in exchange for the US removal of the Jupiter 
missiles from İzmir-Çiğli airbase in Turkey.  Despite the US efforts to 
compensate Turkey’s security deficit by sending submarine based Polaris 
missiles, becoming a matter of bargain between the two superpowers had 
left question marks in the Turkish public opinion about the reliability of US 
support in case of a real crisis. 
However, the serious blow to the Turkish-US relations came with the 
Johnson letter of 1964 in which the US warned Turkey about the political 
consequences of a possible military intervention in Cyprus to protect 
Turkish Cypriots.  In this bluntly written letter, President Johnson stated that 
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the US did not approve of Turkey’s launching a military campaign which 
might lead to a Russian involvement in the conflict.  Under these 
circumstances Turkey had to face the consequences of a military campaign 
alone and should not expect NATO to come to aid in case of a Soviet attack.  
What’s more, Washington opposed to Turkey’s use of the US military 
hardware in such a military operation which lacked US consent and warned 
Ankara that the military supply was given to Turkey only for defensive 
purposes.21  
The Johnson letter presented a turning point in Turkish-American 
relations particularly for the Turkish foreign policy, in the sense that, on a 
highly critical issue where Turkish national interests were at stake, the 
Turks were left alone by their strongest ally.  Furthermore, the American 
political stance which seemed to be favoring the Greek side created a feeling 
of betrayal and disappointment at both official and public levels.  This 
feeling of betrayal inclined Turkey to seek alternatives to the United States 
in terms of economic and political cooperation.  In this respect, Johnson 
letter signified a shift in Turkish foreign policy towards a multi-dimensional 
foreign policy line, thus “ended the phase of ‘unquestioned cooperation’ 
with the US.”22 
 Following 1964, Turkey sought to strengthen her ties with the 
Soviet Union and the Third World and adopted a more distanced political 
attitude vis-à-vis the United States.  In 1965 Turkey voted against the US 
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use of force in Vietnam at the UN General Assembly.  In 1967 Ankara 
concluded an economic agreement with the USSR worth a $ 200 million in 
cheap credits.  This led the US officials to question Turkey’s intentions 
whether she was changing axis or not.23 Moreover, Turkey withdrew from 
the Multilateral Force (MLF) which was one of NATO’s new security 
establishments, yet signed a Joint Defense Agreement with the US in 1969.  
This new security agreement compiled the previous bilateral treaties as well 
as the informal security arrangements between the two countries and 
comprised critical changes in favor of Turkey such as the control of the US 
military bases and the status of the US military personnel in Turkey.  In the 
following years, Turkish American relations would enter a turbulent period 
with Bülent Ecevit’s coming to power and his authorization for the 
resumption of the opium poppy cultivation in 1974 as one of his campaign 
promises.  However, the Turkish military intervention to Cyprus the same 
year would overshadow the opium issue and lead to further deterioration of 
the bilateral relations.24 
According to Oran, the underlying motive of following a “relatively 
autonomous” foreign policy towards 1970s and on was mostly in order to 
gain political support for the Cyprus issue at the international level and to 
find alternative sources which would compensate the decreasing US 
economic aids due to the growing tension over Cyprus and the impact of the 
ethnic lobbies.  The oil crisis of 1973 also had an impact on Turkey’s 
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rapprochement with the Middle Eastern Countries.  Promoting political and 
economic relations with the oil rich Arab world would enable Turkey to 
overcome her economic challenges due to the oil shortages and decrease her 
political isolation over the Cyprus issue.  Nevertheless, Turkey did not join 
the non-aligned movement and remained within the Western defense block 
despite the growing anti-American sentiments in the society parallel to the 
rise of the Turkish Left and to the international developments of the period. 
As a result of Vietnam War the US had lost a great deal of political 
prestige.  The emergence of new economic competitors like Germany and 
Japan along with the economic challenges of the Vietnam defeat and the 
continuing nuclear race with the USSR were among the factors which 
undermined the economic superiority of the United States.25  Therefore, 
warming relations with the Soviet Union would provide a breathing space 
for both sides since the two superpowers  reached a nuclear parity which 
would result in mutually assured destruction (MAD). 
However, the rapprochement efforts between the two superpowers 
which bore their fruits in the Final Document of Helsinki Summit in 1975 
loosened the ties between Turkey and the United States (and paved the way 
for pursuing their own national interests).  Since the Turkish-American 
alliance rested upon the common strategic aim of containing the Soviet 
Union, it was this sense of unity against a foreign threat which limited the 
scope of disagreement between the allies.  At times when the Soviet threat 
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started to fade away as in the period of detente in the 1970s, their conflicting 
interests resurfaced.26 
In fact, anti-Americanism was already on the rise in Turkey owing to 
the impact of the Cuban Missile Crisis and the Johnson letter.  The Turkish 
political elites under the leadership of the Turkish Labor Party (TIP) were 
criticizing the scope and purposes of the given US aids and even suggesting 
Turkey to quit NATO.27  Besides, the conspiracy theories about the United 
States carrying out Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) operations aiming to 
destroy the Turkish Left served as a part of the political discourse for the 
Turkish Left and led to further political polarization.28  In light of these 
developments, the public discontent towards the United States resulted in 
attacks which targeted the US military personnel and the diplomats such that 
the US military decided to keep a low profile in Turkey and called back the 
US ambassador in 1969.29  
As Philip Robin states, the Johnson letter was a shocking experience 
for the Turkish society and the events of 1974 confirmed that there were 
limits to which Turkey could rely on her superpower ally.30  On July 15, the 
National Guard of Cyprus, acting on the orders from the junta in Athens,31 
organized a coup against Makarios.  As one of the guarantors of the 1960 
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Cyprus constitution, Turkey responded to the military coup against 
Makarios by launching a military campaign to provide a safe heaven for the 
Turkish Cypriots.  Turkish troops landed on the island on July 26 and 
launched a second offensive on August 14, establishing a Turkish Cypriot 
zone on the north coast of the island from Famagusta to Morphou.32  While 
the young and promising Prime Minister Ecevit became a national hero, 
Turkey had to face the United Nations (UN) condemnation and coercive 
resolutions demanding her withdrawal from the island.  What’s more, owing 
to the pressure of the Greek lobby the US Congress decided to impose a 
direct arm sales embargo on Turkey. 
As Cengiz Çandar asserts, the embargo of 1975 had a more 
devastating impact on Turkish-American relations than the Johnson letter.  
Especially, the Turkish military as an institution affected directly from the 
embargo perceived this political move as an unjust punishment by an ally 
for an action that was a national cause and in Turkey’s interest.33  In fact, 
the arms embargo aimed at forcing Turkey to step back on Cyprus issue.  In 
contrast, Turkey responded to the embargo by closing the military bases to 
the US and by suspending the Joint Defense Agreement of 1969.  In 1975 
Turkey declared the establishment of Turkish Federated State of Cyprus. 
 As Stephen F. Larrabee and Ian O. Lesser point out in their analysis 
of Turkish-American relations, both sides have used security cooperation as 
a lever in bilateral relations such as suspending the military aid or banning 
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the use of military bases as in the case of the Cyprus conflict.34  However, 
concerned with the international developments which signaled the coming 
of a “Second Cold War,” the US lifted the embargo in 1978 without getting 
any concrete results in the Cyprus issue. 
With the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the coup in Iran in 
1979, the cold war tensions shifted towards the Middle East and Turkey 
once more became the focus of US attention with her military and strategic 
importance as a loyal ally located in a troubled region.  With the 
proclamation of Carter doctrine in 1980, securing the energy resources and 
strengthening American position in the Gulf have become the new strategic 
priorities for the US.35  The United States approached a number of pro-
Western states -including Turkey- in order to obtain military bases for the 
creation of Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) for use in the Persian Gulf-Red 
Sea region.  However, Turkey refused to take part in the RDF because of 
concern for the reaction of the Arab states; instead, the US and Turkey 
concluded the Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement (DECA) in 
March 1980 as a sign of increasing cooperation.  Therefore, it is possible to 
say that as the cold war tension escalated once more in the 1980s, the 
Turkish-American relations entered a cooperative phase based on the 
traditional equation of interests-providing bases in response for aids- and 
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“Turkey became a pillar of Washington’s strategy to protect American 
interests in the Middle East.”36 
 Another factor which paved the way for close cooperation between 
Ankara and Washington has been the military coup of 1980.  Sharp 
criticisms from Europe over the role of Turkish military in politics and the 
human rights abuses which reached their peak during the 1980 military rule 
distanced Turkey from Europe, whereas for the United States, Turkey 
presented a reliable ally with her cooperative military regime in a politically 
unstable environment.37  In order to break this political isolation, the 
military junta didn’t hesitate to give political concessions to the US as in the 
case of Rogers Plan in which Turkey withdrew her veto against the return of 
Greece to NATO’s military command without a quid pro quo.38  Also in 
November 1980 the military regime approved the Defense and Economic 
Cooperation Agreement (DECA) which designed the framework of 
economic and security cooperation with the US for the next five years.  
Instead of an outright approval for the RDF, Turkey agreed with the United 
States on the modernization of its military airbases and construction of two 
new bases in Muş and Batman according to the Memorandum of 
Understanding in 1982.39 
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The Turkish-American relations have entered a new phase with the 
transfer of political power to a civilian government as the Motherland party 
(ANAP) came to power under the leadership of Turgut Özal in 1983.  Özal 
was a prominent political figure and the architect of 24 January 1980 
economic reform program.  He had worked in the World Bank and was 
known to financial circles in the West and within the business community in 
Turkey.40  As a free market economist and pragmatic leader, Özal 
concentrated on the domestic economic development as well as improving 
economic ties with all the surrounding regions.   
As Hugh and Nicole Pope state, Özal sought above all a change in 
mentality, converting the Turks into a thoroughly business-minded people.  
Huge amounts of money were spent on the infrastructure such as building 
new motorways, dams, bridges, airports, yacht marinas, telephone 
exchanges.  Besides, Özal implemented new economic policies encouraging 
Turkish businessmen to produce for export and explore new markets in the 
Middle East and the Caucasus.  The economic modernization created a 
wealthy class in the Turkish society.  On the other hand, Özal’s cross border 
activism enabled political actors such as the Turkish Businessmen 
Association Council (TUSIAD) to increase their political leverage on 
foreign affairs.  Soon, the Turkish businessmen would arrive in Washington 
to lobby the US Congress on behalf of their own interests.  As a result of 
“the Özal revolution,” the Turks emerged tougher and more competitive, far 
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more confident about their place in the world and their future prospects as a 
regional commercial power.41 
The novelty that Özal brought to Turkish-American relations was not 
only the political intimacy at the leadership level which urged the US 
President to cut his press meeting on CNN in the middle to take Özal’s 
phone call or his pragmatic style of diplomacy, bypassing bureaucratic 
channels to settle the issues right away and at first hand.42  By introducing 
“not aid but trade” policy, Özal sought to improve economic relations with 
the United States and thus attempted to raise Turkey’s status as a trading 
partner.  Instead of asking more dept relief or more aid, he demanded fair 
trade opportunities and transfer of technology which would enable Turkish 
economy to stand on her feet and decrease Turkey’s economic and military 
overdependence on the United States.  Özal’s policies would bear their fruits 
in time such that, by the 1990s, of the nine F-16 warplanes out of 3000 
produced around the world to be awarded a ‘perfect grade’, three were to be 
assembled in Turkey.43 
Despite Özal’s intimate relations with the American President and 
his close cooperation with the United States, there remained contentious 
issues between the two countries which created discontent among the Turks.  
During the Özal period, the US Congress insisted on applying 7:10 ratio44 
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on the arms sales to Greece and Turkey respectively and continued to attach 
preconditions to economic and military aids such as bringing a solution to 
Cyprus question or improving its human rights record.  Unfortunately, 
strategic issues remained hostage to the leverage of the ethnic lobbies due to 
the absence of a strong Turkish lobby in the US.  Nevertheless, Özal chose 
to work closely with the United States.  As Soli Özel indicates, within the 
context of his cross border activism Özal used the United States as leverage 
in order to create new international openings-particularly on relations with 
the Turkic states- and to bring solutions to many contentious issues (i.e. the 
Kurdish problem). 
The international system inevitably changed as the Soviet Union 
dissolved in 1991.  The end of the Cold War brought along the necessity of 
redefining the bilateral relations while the future of NATO remained 
uncertain.  These uncertainties of the 1990s would bring Turkey and the 
United States closer to a level of “strategic partnership.”  Especially, the 
Gulf War of 1991 would serve as a defining moment in terms of bilateral 
relation which gave Turkey the opportunity to reaffirm her geopolitical 
importance and present herself as an indispensable ally for the United 
States. 
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CHAPTER II 
 TURKISH-AMERICAN RELATIONS IN THE POST-COLD WAR 
CONTEXT 
The post-cold war period following the fall of the Berlin Wall in 
1989 brought along profound changes as well as uncertainties for the 
international system.  With the collapse of the USSR, the United States 
emerged as the sole superpower.  However, the absence of a common 
enemy led to a questioning of the raison d’etre of both the Atlantic alliance 
and the international institutions which served as the main pillars of this 
alliance such as NATO.  The new international setting due to the 
elimination of the Soviet threat and the emergence of the new states in 
Eastern Europe and the Caucasus necessitated a redefinition of the role and 
responsibilities of the United States in this unipolar world.45   
The end of the Cold War did not only signify an economic collapse 
of the Soviet Union owing to the continuous arms race with the United 
States.  It also meant an ideological defeat of communism vs. capitalism.  
The post-Cold War era promised a new world order based upon American 
supremacy and American values such as a liberal capitalist economic 
system, freedom, democracy, and human rights.  However, there was an 
ongoing debate on whether this new world would become as peaceful and 
rosy a place as Francis Fukuyama depicted in his “End of History” or not.46  
In contrast to Fukuyama’s optimistic anticipations, many analysts were 
predicting that a world of chaos would dominate the political scene as 
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Samuel Huntington claimed in “The Clash of Civilizations” where a clash of 
ideologies would be replaced by clash of civilizations based on cultural 
differences.47 
While the political analysts were looking for new strategies on how 
to handle the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the technological advances of 
the 1990s were accelerating economic, technological, political, and cultural 
integration known as globalization.  As the forces of globalization blurred 
the line between the domestic and the international, the events beyond 
national borders -such as ethnic strife, terrorism, proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction (WMD), drug trafficking, spread of infectious diseases, 
and environmental degradation- started attracting more attention.  
Given its military and economic superiority, the United States 
appeared to be the only global actor capable of confronting these 
unconventional threats which required strong leadership and overseas 
engagement.  However, whether the United States would and should assume 
the role of a world policeman or not was another matter of debate.  With no 
imminent military threat to American interests, the US public opinion was 
in favor of following a neo-isolationist foreign policy.  With candidates 
focusing on domestic matters, particularly the economy, the presidential 
campaigns of the 1992 elections reflected this public tendency.48 
However, as demonstrated by the Gulf War experience and the 
international developments throughout the 1990s -such as those in Haiti, 
Somalia, Bosnia, Northern Iraq and Kosovo-, the world looked no safer than 
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the Cold War period.  The complex security environment of the post-cold 
war period and the reluctance of the international community to act without 
American leadership led the US policy makers to make a reassessment of 
their strategic priorities. 
As for Turkey, the end of the Cold War inevitably raised concerns 
over her declining geopolitical importance for the United States as well as 
for Europe.  The changing political landscape with the dissolution of the 
Soviet Union and the emergence of new neighboring states required a 
redefinition of Turkey’s place and role in the international system.  During 
the integration process of the former Soviet states to the European system 
with an emphasis on their European identity, Turkey suddenly found herself 
out of the league.  As the 1989 decision of the European Community 
confirmed, with respect to embracing  the core European values such as 
democracy, civil society, and respect for human rights, Turkey did not live 
up to European standards.  On the other hand, the debates over the future of 
NATO and the CFE treaty were perceived as early indicators of Turkey’s 
waning military influence.  Particularly, the gradual downsizing of the US 
military installations and personnel along with a decline in the US foreign 
aid to Turkey were considered as worrisome developments by a flank state 
whose main ties to the Western world, particularly to the United States have 
been primarily security related.  Therefore with the end of Cold War, 
Turkey faced the risk of being excluded from the political - security 
architecture of the new world order with respect to her declining strategic 
value.49 
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However, contrary to the expectations, the change in Turkey’s 
geostrategic environment paved the way for new areas of cooperation for 
Turkey and the United States parallel to the developments in the Middle 
East, the Balkans, and the Caucasus.  As a key ally located in an unstable 
region, Turkey assumed a pivotal role in securing US interests as a bulwark 
against the instability of the Middle East, balancer against Russian interests 
in Central Asian Republics, and stabilizer in the Balkans.50  In this respect, 
the Gulf War provided an opportunity for solidifying US support and for 
reasserting Turkey’s geopolitical importance in the eyes of the international 
community.  So much so that “strategic relations” of the post-Gulf War 
environment evolved into a “strategic partnership” as in 1999 President 
Clinton declared in his speech at the Turkish National Assembly to define 
Turkish-American relations of the era on the basis of converging political 
interests. 
 
 
Gulf War-A defining Moment for the Turkish-American Relations 
 
The Gulf War was the first international crisis of the post-cold war 
era.  A broad coalition of international forces including 34 countries 
successfully defeated Saddam Hussein’s Iraq and forced him to withdraw 
from Kuwait with a remarkably short operation..  Annexation of Kuwait by 
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Saddam was believed to be a part of a larger plan designated to capture the 
oil fields of Saudi Arabia and claim the leadership of Arab world by 
controlling the largest share of the world’s oil supplies.  However, by 
depending upon the power vacuum that the disappearance of the Soviets 
created and the distraction of the United States and Europe, Saddam 
miscalculated the international response when he invaded Kuwait on 
August, 1990.  Contrary to Saddam’s political calculations, the lack of 
superpower confrontation led to the United States and the Soviets taking 
part on the same side against the dictator.  Furthermore, the annexation of a 
fellow Arab country by another caused dissent among the Arabs.  Therefore, 
following the invasion, a series of resolutions were passed through the 
United Nations and the Arab League condemning Iraq and demanding the 
withdrawal of its troops from Kuwait.  The international community backed 
the United States and tried a number of diplomatic ways from sending 
diplomatic envoys to applying economic sanctions to force Iraq out of 
Kuwait but to no avail.  On November 29, 1990 the United Nations passed 
the resolution 678 giving Iraq a withdrawal deadline of January 15, 1991 
and authorizing the use of force through the resolution 660.  When the 
diplomatic efforts failed to convince Saddam to retreat from Kuwait, the 
United States commenced the operation Desert Storm on January 17, 
1991.51  
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To borrow a phrase from George H. W. Bush, Gulf War was a 
defining moment in the post-cold war world.  On the one hand, it was a test 
of US willingness to fulfill its mission of continuing leadership in the post-
cold war world in the name of preserving global stability.  On the other 
hand, the Gulf War served as an opportunity for the international 
community to demonstrate its commitment to the basic tenets of the new 
world order, i.e. The rule of international law, the sovereignty of nations, 
democracy and freedom-  through the efficient working of the collective 
security mechanisms such as the UN and the NATO.  As Ted G. Carpenter 
points out in his analysis, in terms of US foreign policy objectives, a 
vigorous and uncompromising response to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait was 
essential to deter other potential aggressors.52  In this respect, the Gulf War 
can be considered as a successful operation for the Bush administration in 
terms of liberating Kuwait through building a coalition of unprecedented 
size and providing the international legal basis for US and coalition forces.53  
However, to many political analysts, the Gulf War appeared as an 
unfinished task since President H. W. Bush who was not keen on nation 
building left the toppling of Saddam to the internal forces within the 
country, i.e. The Kurds and the Shiite.  Analysts like Terry Deibel criticized 
Bush’s decision to terminate the Gulf War before Husseins’s fall as 
sacrificing the US interests for the sake of avoiding international 
pressures.54 
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Turkish-US Cooperation in the Gulf War 
 
Turkey’s decision to support the US led coalition in the Gulf War 
signified a radical departure in the Turkish Foreign policy making in terms 
of abandoning the traditional policy of non-interference in Middle Eastern 
affairs.  As an ambitious political leader, Turgut Ozal saw the Gulf War as 
an opportunity to reassure Turkey’s geopolitical importance to the West by 
following a more active and pro-Western foreign policy in the road to war.55  
According to Özal, Turkey should not remain outside the political 
developments which reshaped the world map, particularly the Middle East 
and should have its place at the table of negotiations.  As Mustafa Aydın 
asserts, Özal envisioned Turkey to become a regional power and believed 
that keeping Turkey away from international conflicts and problems would 
not help build a powerful Turkey.56  On the contrary, what Turkey needed 
was a powerful and determined foreign policy, able to take calculated risks. 
Özal considered Turkey’s involvement in the Gulf War as a political 
investment.  Siding with the US would pay off in terms of political and 
economic openings from the United States and indirectly contribute to 
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Turkey’s aspirations for EU membership.57  Therefore despite the public 
opposition to the war, Turkey offered close assistance to the United States 
during the Gulf War.  Other than diplomatic gestures such as closing the oil 
pipelines a day after the UN resolution, Turkey opened its military bases 
and its airspace to the coalition forces and deployed Turkish troops on the 
Iraqi border.  However, Özal’s handling of the crisis and his attempt to run 
Turkey’s foreign policy as in a presidential system was harshly criticized 
and led to resignations from his cabinet.58  Particularly, the speculations on 
Özal’s intentions which claimed opening a second land front in the Northern 
Iraq to capture the oil rich provinces of Mosul and Kirkuk led to the 
resignation of the Chief of General Staff.   
The close cooperation of the US and Turkey during the Gulf War, 
particularly the intimate relations between the two political leaders and their 
phone diplomacy opened a new page in bilateral relations in the uncertain 
political environment of the post-Cold War world.  However, with respect to 
the long-term political and economic consequences, the Gulf War left a 
legacy of distrust and disappointment on the Turkish side.  The 
contradictory outcomes of the war led to an erosion of confidence over the 
Turkish side towards the US policies in the region which continued to 
undermine bilateral relations in the following decades.   
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As a neighboring state, Turkey was directly affected by the political 
and economic arrangements in Iraq.  After the withdrawal of the coalition 
forces from Iraq, Turkey had to live with the reality that Saddam regime was 
left in power.  The Bush administration was anticipating the Saddam regime 
to be overthrown by the internal forces within the country, i.e. the Kurds 
and the Shia communities.  However, the United States did not deliver 
support to the Kurdish and Shia uprisings and left them to their own devices 
when Saddam Hussein launched a military campaign to suppress the 
rebellions.  Eventually, Iraqi Kurds rushed to the Turkish border in 1991.  
Fearing another refugee crisis similar to that of 1987, Turkish officials 
appealed to the UN to bring an immediate solution to the problem.59   
Therefore, in 1991, Operation Provide Comfort (OPC)-Operation 
Poised Hammer as known in Turkey- was created to conduct humanitarian 
assistance and return refugees to their home.60  The UN enforcement of a 
security zone in the north of 36th parallel through OPC and OPC II eased the 
tension to an extent; however it also led to an internationalization of the 
Kurdish problem, particularly Turkey’s own Kurdish reality.  Turkey’s 
handling of the Kurdish insurgency in the Southeast Anatolia had become a 
subject matter of criticism by the international community because of 
human rights violations.  While Ankara often regarded international 
pressures which urged Turkey to devise a political solution to Kurdish 
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problem as interference in Turkey’s domestic affairs, human rights record of 
Turkey had become a crucial factor determining Turkish-American relations 
in the 1990s.61 
The OPC constituted an important part of Turkish-US relations in 
the 1990s despite its controversial implications on Turkey’s foreign policy 
towards Iraq.  Establishment of a Kurdish “safe haven” which initially 
aimed at protecting Iraqi Kurds from Saddam’s military and political 
harassment led to a power vacuum in the Northern Iraq.  This power 
vacuum was claimed to have given PKK a free hand in the region and 
advanced the establishment of a de-facto Kurdish state.  Emergence of a 
separate Kurdish entity in the neighborhood was perceived as a threatening 
development on the Turkish side since it might have an inspiring effect on 
the Turkish Kurds to follow suit.  Thus, the US role as a mediator between 
the Kurdish leaders to establish a political authority in the region was met 
with suspicion especially by the nationalist circles in Turkey.62  What’s 
more, the alleged news reports about the US solders helping the wounded 
PKK guerillas in Northern Iraq turned Turkish public opinion against the 
                                                
61
 Improvement of Turkey’s human rights record had been used as a political leverage by the US Congress under 
Clinton administration.  The US Congress attached conditions on arms sales and suspended the transfer of arms 
to Turkey.  See, Sabri, Sayarı, “Turkish-American Relations in the post-Cold War Era: Issues Convergence and 
Divergence,” in Mustafa Aydın and Çağrı Erhan (eds.), Turkish-American Relations: Past, Present and Future 
(London and New York: Routledge, 2004): 103. 
 
62
 Özal’s policy towards the Iraqi Kurds was to establish a “Big Brother” status and maintain close relations with 
the Kurdish tribal leaders in order to influence the political developments at first hand.  As Mustafa Aydın 
asserts, anticipating the political developments in the Northern Iraq, if some sort of Kurdish entity was going to 
be established, Özal preferred this to happen under Turkish influence.  By the same token, acting as the protector 
of the Iraqi Kurds would prevent any inter-action between PKK guerillas and Iraqi peshmergas.  After Özal’s 
death Turkish foreign policy attained a more nationalist stance and increasing concern for the political 
transformation of a semi-autonomous Kurdistan to an independent Kurdistan led the political elites to support 
policies favoring the territorial integrity of Iraq.  Therefore, they sought to restore ties with Iraqi regime in order 
to compensate their losses from the economic sanctions.  See Mustafa Aydın, Mustafa Aydın, Turkish Foreign 
Policy during the Gulf War 1990-91 (The American University in Cairo Press, 1998);  See also Philip Robins, 
Suits and Uniforms: Turkish Foreign Policy since the Cold War (London: Hurst & Co., 2003): 318-342. 
  40 
United States and led Turkish political elites to question the US intentions 
and the aim of military operations under OPC.63    
The renewal of mandate for the OPC has been a contentious issue in 
the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA), every six months till OPC 
ended with the beginning of "Operation Iraqi Freedom" on March 19, 2003.  
Due to increasing public pressures, OPC was replaced by a downsized force, 
Operation Northern Watch during Necmettin Erbakan’s coalition 
government in 1997.  Nevertheless, the renewal of the OPC's mandate came 
to symbolize the mutual dependence relationship between Ankara and 
Washington.  The US use of İncirlik airbase- was essential for the conduct 
of OPC and for the containment of Saddam.  This provided Ankara a 
bargaining power such as to conduct cross-border operations against the 
PKK which the U.S. refrained to criticize.  Consequently, Ankara avoided 
alienating the United States and continued to give support for the U.S. air 
monitoring of no-fly zones in Northern Iraq.  
Regarding the political and economic consequences of the Gulf War 
on Turkey, Özal’s policies did not produce the outcome he had predicted.  
As mentioned earlier, what Özal had in his mind was to get political and 
economic gains from the United States in return for Turkish solidarity 
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during the Gulf War.  Specifically, he expected greater access to US markets 
for Turkish exports, an increase in military assistance, modernization of the 
Turkish armed forces, expansion of the strategic relationship between the 
two countries, and the US support for Turkey’s aspirations for the European 
Community (EC).  However, Turkey’s cooperation during the Gulf War did 
not alter the Western European attitude to Turkey in general.  As Aydın 
indicates, although Turkey received appreciation from the Western 
European countries for its close cooperation and solidarity, Gulf War did 
not pave the way for Turkey’s EC membership, unlike the impact of the 
Korean War on Turkey’s NATO membership.64  
On the other hand, it was true that the United States doubled 
Turkey’s textile quota and provided a 282 million dollars additional 
assistance for 1991.  However, it was far from satisfying the Turks who 
were expecting a writing-off its total debt as in the case of Egypt with its 7 
billion dollars loan.  Besides, Özal’s initiative to establish a free trade 
agreement with the United States was stillborn.65  Lastly, Turkey received 
$3.5 billion worth of slightly outmoded US weapons not as a reward for its 
support during the Gulf War but through the cascading programme as a 
result of CFE treaty.66  In the following years, Turkey would live through 
many difficulties during the transfer of US weapons and military 
equipments to Turkey due to the Congressional constraints. 
Most analysts agree on the fact that considering the economic losses 
from the closure of the oil pipelines and halting of the cross-border trade 
                                                
64
 Mustafa Aydın, Ten Years After: Turkey’s Gulf Policy (1990-91) Revisited, (Ankara: Center for Eurasian 
Strategic Studies, 2002). 
65
 Stephen F. Larrabee and Ian O. Lesser, Turkish Foreign Policy in an Age of Uncertainty (Santa Monica: 
RAND, 2003): 167. 
66
 Ibid. 
  42 
with Iraq, Turkish economy was severely disrupted by the Gulf War.67  The 
economic donations and credits received from the Gulf and the OECD 
countries failed to compensate Turkey’s losses from the economic embargo 
on Iraq.68  Moreover, the ongoing UN embargo was held responsible for the 
deterioration of the Turkish economy with respect to the rising inflation, 
rising interests and the decreasing GDP following the Gulf War.  Concerned 
with its own economic constraints as well as territorial integrity of Iraq, 
Turkey tried to mend diplomatic and economic relations with the Baghdad 
regime following 1992, while lobbied for a softening of the UN embargo at 
the international level.  Eventually, in April 1995, the UN Security Council 
adopted resolution 986, establishing “Oil for Food” program, allowing Iraq 
to sell oil for the purchase of humanitarian goods.69   
 On the whole, the costs of following a pro-American foreign policy 
in the Gulf War seemed to outweigh the benefits which led to a sense of 
disappointment and suspicion among the Turks.  Especially, the issue of 
“northern Iraq” caused a lot of stir between the two allies and thus had 
become a determining factor of Turkish-US relations in the next decade.  
Nevertheless, it is possible to say that Özal’s Gulf War policy accomplished 
at least one limited goal as having focused the world’s attention back on 
Turkey.  
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Turkish-American Relations in the 1990s 
 
Robert J. Art suggests that what the United States chooses to do or 
not to do inevitably have profound effects not only on its own interests but 
also on those of most other states in the world, thus affects the course of 
world politics to come.70  Therefore, it is important to look at the US foreign 
policy in the 1990s and understand political priorities, interests, and threat 
perceptions of the United States in order to situate Turkey in the US foreign 
policy and define the areas of conflict and cooperation between the two 
countries. 
In fact, “It’s the economy, stupid,” the campaign mantra of William 
Jefferson Clinton gave a hint of the next administration’s foreign policy 
thinking.71  Throughout his campaign Clinton criticized Bush for being more 
concerned with foreign affairs than domestic needs and defined him as a 
failed leader who refused to take steps to end the economic recession.72  
Obviously, foreign policy issues were not at the top of his political agenda.  
Instead, he was promising to “invest in America” and “focus like laser” on 
the economy to create more jobs and promote economic growth which 
would eventually increase American competitiveness abroad.  His critics 
claimed that he had no experience in the foreign policy realm and therefore 
he could not be qualified as a foreign policy president.  However, 
international challenges forced Clinton administration to review its foreign 
policy goals and develop a strategy in a world where to be safe at home 
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depended on dealing with the unconventional threats that put global peace 
and stability at jeopardy.73    
Considering American primacy and the challenges of the global era, 
the remarks of Anthony Lake in 1993 are important to understand both the 
structure and dynamics of the post-cold war world, and the parameters of 
the US foreign policy throughout the 1990s.74  According to Lake, to the 
extent that democracy and economics were embraced by other nations, the 
United States would be more secure, prosperous, and influential, while the 
broader world would be more humane and peaceful.  Therefore, the 
successor to a doctrine of containment had to be a strategy of enlargement, 
enlargement of the world’s free community of market democracies.  The 
enlargement of the democratic core would secure interests and promote a 
security zone based on the liberal democratic view that the democracies tend 
not to wage war.  In this respect, the United States should not only engage in 
the international system but should lead the world based on the following 
principles: 
-Strengthening the community of market democracies,  
-enlarging the democratic zone by fostering new democracies and 
market economies 
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-providing humanitarian assistance to help democracy flourish in 
other regions of the world. 
-countering the aggression by minimizing the ability of backlash 
states 75outside the circle of democracy and markets to threaten it. 
However, it was a matter of debate how to combine the goals and the 
means in an efficient way to avoid an imperial overstretch.  In this respect 
Chase, Hill and Kennedy offered a new US strategy based on providing 
assistance to a number of states-pivotal states- rather than spreading its 
energy and attention over the globe.76  The term of “pivotal state” was used 
to indicate the countries located on an unstable region and whose futures 
were likely to affect international stability.  These pivotal states were 
Mexico and Brazil; Algeria, Egypt, and South Africa; India and Pakistan; 
Indonesia; and Turkey.  
 
Turkey as a pivotal state 
 
Turkey was located at a key geostrategic crossroads for U.S security 
interests not only in terms of geographical proximity to the international 
conflicts of the 1990s but also as a bridge for the energy transportation and 
international trade.  A prosperous, stable Turkey would be a factor for 
stability in a number of different areas: the Balkans, the Caucasus, the 
Middle East, and Europe.77  However, the US view of Turkey began to take 
shape in the second half of the 1990s.  Turkey became a truly pivotal state 
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CHAPTER III 
TURKISH-AMERICAN RELATIONS IN THE SEPTEMBER 11 
CONTEXT: FROM AFGHANISTAN TO IRAQ 
 
The terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon 
marked a turning point for Americans altering their world view and 
priorities.  On September 11, 2001, the United States was hit at home and 
about three thousand people were killed within two hours.  The 
globalization showed its hideous face through a cyber space of terrorist 
networks and their plans for taking revenge from the world of modernity.  A 
deadly combination of radicalism and technology were responsible for the 
change in the threat perception of the United States.  In the aftermath of the 
attacks, Americans faced their vulnerability, and realized that even weak 
states like Afghanistan could pose a great danger to the national security, 
and neither the geographical advantage of the two vast oceans nor their 
unrivalled military power provided safety.   
The 9/11 experience changed the common perspective on terrorism.  
Terrorist activities which used to be perceived as a problem of domestic 
politics had become a global threat addressing all nations and necessitating 
collective action.  Therefore, following the attacks, international community 
stood behind the Americans, shared their grief and supported the US efforts 
to search and punish the responsible. On September 12, the United Nations 
passed a resolution, authorizing “all necessary steps” to respond the attacks.  
The same day, NATO invoked its Article 5 of “Collective Defense” -for the 
first time in the treaty’s history-calling for a joint response to defend a 
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member under attack.  Therefore, when fingers pointed to al Qaeda, 119, a 
terrorist organization operating from Afghanistan under the protection of 
Taliban regime, the international community was ready to join the U.S-led 
coalition forces to commence Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF).120 
The traumatic experience of 9/11 inevitably led to a reassessment of 
many aspects of the US foreign policy, shaping their attitude toward other 
countries as well as their handling of American power.  The state of 
insecurity enabled more conservative groups-known as the neocons-within 
the Bush administration to gain influence over the US foreign policy 
making, and implement the strategies they had been advocating since the 
early 1990s.121Combining democratic ideals with the exercise of pre-
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emptive power, the National Security Strategy (NSS) of 2002 reflected a 
shift in the US foreign policy towards a more unilateralist and assertive line.  
122
  
 
The Grand Strategy of the United States after 9/11 
 
The NSS of 2002 which set the US foreign policy framework in the 
post-September 11 environment, identified terrorists groups, weapons of 
mass destruction (WMD) and rouge states123as the main threats to US 
security.  It was a matter of concern that terrorist activities could gain a 
more lethal dimension once the terrorist groups acquired WMD and the 
“rouge states could provide WMD to terrorists, giving them the means to 
match their hatred.”  Therefore, the threat facing the United States were to 
involve rouge states such as Iran, Iraq, and North Korea that were seeking 
WMD.  As President Bush stated in his State of the Union address in 
January 2002, “States like these and their terrorist allies constituted an axis 
of evil.”  However, confronting these unconventional threats required going 
beyond the traditional defense policies of deterrence and containment and in 
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some cases necessitated acting preemptively before the danger emerges.124 
Although the NSS document emphasized the importance of strengthening 
alliances to defeat global terrorism, it also underlined the US right to act 
unilaterally if necessary to protect the nation and the country.  
As G. John Ikenberry argued, the NSS formed a neo-imperial vision 
in which the United States assumed a global role of setting standards, 
determining threats, using force, and meting out justice.125  In fact, neither 
unilateralism nor the right of preemption was a new theme for the US policy 
makers.  Within the first eight months in office, the Bush administration 
showed disdain for international commitments and tended towards 
unilateralism.  In May 2001, President Bush declared the U.S interest in 
developing a national missile defense system.126   This was followed by the 
US withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol and the ABM Treaty while the 
Bush administration continued its campaign against the International 
Criminal Court.  Besides, the United States also blocked the international 
efforts to strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention at a time when 
reports of anthrax mailings127 demonstrated how the biological materials 
could be used for terrorism.   
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As for the right of preemption, the United States always had the 
option of using force preemptively and experience from the past128.  
However, the Bush administration was criticized for having turned the right 
of preemption into a doctrine by publicizing a mere policy option.129  By 
declaring it publicly, the United States not only drew/has drawn an arrogant 
and unilateral image but also provided a pretext for other countries to claim 
the same right in order to pursue their own agendas.  What’s more the 
borders of this preemptive strike doctrine were so vague and elastic that it 
was left to the mercy of the United States to decide what constituted a 
threat, serious enough to wage a war.   
 
Transatlantic Split 
 
International solidarity for the US war on terrorism gradually faded 
in time as policy divergences and changes in threat perceptions surfaced on 
both sides of the Atlantic parallel to the changes in the US foreign policy.   
While the process of extending the war on terrorism from Afghanistan to 
Iraq exposed the pre-existing structural differences between the United 
States and Europe, rigid rhetoric and diplomatic mistakes on both sides 
exacerbated the growing rifts, and led to a transatlantic crisis.  As Robert 
Kagan asserted in his famous essay “Power and Weakness”, “when it came 
to setting national priorities, determining threats, defining challenges, and 
fashioning and implementing foreign and defense policies, the United States 
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and Europe had parted ways”.  According to Kagan, the underlying reasons 
for the transatlantic divide stemmed from the growing disparity of power 
between the United States and Europe.130  The US military power provided 
a propensity to use it, unilaterally if necessary.  Europeans, by contrast, due 
to their lack of military capacity tended towards cooperation through the 
international institutions to prevent conflicts.  They preferred to deal with 
problems through economic integration, foreign aid, and multilateral 
institutions, using carrot over stick.131  Kagan claimed that, the unparalleled 
military power of the United States provided security for the Europeans by 
confronting challenges beyond Europe’s capacity, thus enabled the 
Europeans to live in a “Kantian” paradise -a postmodern world of “laws and 
transnational negotiation and cooperation”.  However, at the same time, the 
US willingness to use that strength and its growing tendency to act 
unilaterally posed a threat to the foundations of this European world order. 
  With regard to the diverging threat perceptions of the transatlantic 
allies on the road to Iraq War, Andrew Moravcsik claimed that since the 
terrorist attacks were not directed against them, Europeans found the threat 
less pressing.  Instead, they were more concerned of a possible spillover of 
the Middle East instability, considering large Muslim populations at home 
and their relations with the Middle Eastern countries.  Moreover, most 
Europeans felt that the war in Iraq, unlike the War in Afghanistan was not 
really connected to the “war on terrorism.  Instead, the United States seemed 
to be launching a war of choice in Iraq in order to complete an unfinished 
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task since the Gulf War by toppling Saddam Hussein.  It is therefore 
interesting that on September 20, 2001, the Project for the New American 
Century (PNAC)) presented a letter to President George W. Bush, advising 
a regime change in Iraq “even if evidence does not link Iraq directly to the 
attack.132 
As Zbigniew Brzezinski points out, the evident reluctance to see a 
connection between Middle Eastern terrorists and the political problems of 
the Middle East, fueled suspicions in the international community that the 
U.S. was exploiting the campaign against terrorism for regional political 
ends.133  The most popular theory on the true motive behind the US toppling 
of Saddam Hussein suggested that the US intention to invade Iraq was 
actually to control the large oil fields of Iraq.134  From a broader geopolitical 
perspective, controlling Iraqi oil fields would provide the US control of oil 
lands of the Middle East and Central Asia.  By controlling an important 
supply of oil for the world, the United States would strengthen its hand 
against the potential rivals challenging the US global dominance, i.e. Europe 
and China. 
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Besides such claims that geopolitical objectives drove US action, 
analysts/academics like Chalmers Johnson pointed at on Israeli factor 
referring to the impact of the Jewish lobby on the US politics.  Johnson 
argued that one of the reasons of the US invasion of Iraq was to protect 
Israel’s security and its regional military superiority.  The strongest 
argument supporting this theory was that the key figures in the (second) 
Bush administration -such as chairman of the Defense Policy Board Richard 
Perle, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, and Undersecretary of 
Defense for Policy Douglas Feith -maintained close relations with Ariel 
Sharon, then Prime Minister of Israel and the Likud Party.  Moreover, 
through the publishing of the think tanks and sometimes through letters to 
the US President they have advocated policies favoring Israeli geo-strategic 
benefits.135 
In response to these claims, the Bush administration emphasized that 
Saddam Hussein was a dictator who brutalized his own people and posed a 
threat to international security by his seeking of weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD).  With respect to the deep split of the allies over Iraq, 
Philip Gordon and Jeremy Shapiro argued that Europeans did not deny that 
Iraq was a problem, but they disagreed about the solution.136  Considering 
the ethnic and sectarian divisions in the country, Europeans regarded a 
regime change through military intervention without a concrete plan for the 
post- Saddam Iraq as a strategic mistake.  However, the United States 
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underestimated European and world opposition to the war and failed to 
engage key players such as Germany and France.137  
In many aspects, the U.S. public diplomacy failed to explain 
Washington’s concerns to the world on Iraq.  Partly, the diplomatic style of 
the U.S Secretary of State Colin L. Powell was responsible- his preference 
for making phone calls instead of traveling and establishing face to face 
contact.138  On the other hand, it is true that by adapting a rhetoric which 
divided the world between good and evil, the United States alienated its 
allies and left no room for moderates.  Moreover, the Bush administration’s 
“the mission will build the coalition” approach led to a conviction that the 
United States was determined to overthrow Saddam regime no matter what. 
Only a week before the UN Security Council’s resolution 1441139, in an 
interview with the BBC, the US Secretary of State Colin Powell stated that: 
“The US continues to believe that the best way to disarm Iraq is through a 
regime change.”140Besides, the tactical maneuvers of Iraq-its half 
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compliance with the UN inspection regime confused the world public 
opinion towards Saddam regime.  Due to the domestic opposition from its 
allies i.e. The United Kingdom and Spain, Washington tried to push for a 
second UN resolution authorizing the use military force.  Meanwhile, the 
reports of the UN Chief Weapon Inspector Hans Blix 141 presented no 
concrete evidence on WMD program of Iraq.  Eventually, the War in Iraq 
started in March 2003 with no further UN resolution, lacking international 
legitimacy. 
 
Turkey and the United States from 9/11 towards the 1st of March 
 
At first glance, the terrorist attacks had an impact of drawing the 
United States and Turkey closer.  As a country having suffered from 
terrorist violence for decades, Turkey shared a common concern with the 
United States in fighting global terrorism and therefore granted full support 
for the US efforts to curb off the terrorist cells in Afghanistan.  As Steven A. 
Cook observed, the Turkish government adopted a supportive/constructive 
approach towards Washington’s presentation of evidence linking Bin Laden 
to the attacks.142  On October 3, 2001, the then Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit 
stated on Sabah daily, “The fact that the US found the evidence persuasive 
persuades us also.”143Moreover, in the early hours of October 8, as the 
United States and Great Britain started launching attacks on Taliban and al 
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CHAPTER IV 
ANALYSIS OF MARCH I 
 
On March 1, 2003, the Turkish Parliament turned down the motion 
which would have allowed U.S. troops to be based on Turkish soil and open 
a northern front against Iraq.  In essence, the outcome was a product of the 
democratic process in a parliamentary system.  However, Turkey’s decision 
after long and exhausting negotiations disappointed the U.S. side, forcing 
them to change their war plans in the last minute.159  Since the US officials 
held the Turkish military responsible for not using its political leverage to 
pass the resolution, the defense partnership- widely considered as the main 
pillar of the US-Turkish relations- was severely damaged.160  After March 1, 
Turkey opened its airspace and later in the year approved a motion to send 
Turkish troops to Iraq for cooperation.  However, Turkey’s attempts to 
mend the relations, failed to compensate for having disrupted the US war 
plans with the loss of the northern front. 
To many analysts, the March 1 incident signified a watershed in 
terms of Turkish-Americans relations, burying the so-called “strategic 
partnership” in history.  It is true that Turkey’s decision on March 1 left the 
Turkish-US alliance on sensitive ground.  However, in many aspects 
Turkey’s opposition to the US- led Iraq War had surfaced at both official 
and public levels since the beginning of 2002, as the U.S. demands of 
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cooperation in Iraq started to take an official form.  Considering the ongoing 
policy divergence over Iraq between the United States and Turkey since the 
end of the Gulf War, March 1 was indeed an accident waiting to happen.   
Yet, on the other hand, the inability of the two countries to find a 
common language to share their concerns and resolve their conflicting 
priorities had an undeniable impact on bilateral relations.  Mutual 
misperceptions and false expectations undermined the negotiation process 
on the road to March 1.  What’s more, Turkey’s rejection of the United 
States on such a vital issue led the US side to reconsider Turkey’s strategic 
role as a partner.161  Although the Parliament’s decision received praise 
from the Europeans as well as from Americans who were opposed to the 
war in Iraq, Turkey was seriously concerned about the consequences of 
having turned down the United States.  As the post-war developments in 
Iraq unfolded, these problems grew and formed a crisis of confidence in 
bilateral relations, already shaken by the March 1 incident.  
 However, it is not entirely correct to explain the tension between 
Turkey and the United States in the aftermath of the resolution solely by 
Turkey’s decision on March 1.  Turkish-American relations further 
deteriorated due to the emerging regional dynamics within the course of the 
Iraq War.  The differing political priorities between Turkey and the United 
States over Iraq, particularly Turkey’s fixation on the Kurdish issue and the 
status of northern Iraq prevented the allies from setting a common agenda 
on the post-war developments.  In this context, the changing security 
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paradigms in Iraq complicated cooperation between Turkey and the United 
States, and exacerbated Turkey’s fears of an independent Kurdish entity. 
 In the months following the fall of Baghdad, the US policymakers 
realized that they were facing a harder task than the war in Afghanistan.  
Amid the growing insurgency, Iraqi Kurds emerged as the new allies of 
Washington, since they were representing a relatively peaceful and stable 
area in a volatile region.  In time, Iraqi Kurds gained political leverage over 
the United States due to their role of balancing ethnic-sectarian political 
struggles within Iraq and even succeeded in their efforts to block the 
Turkish offer to send troops to help the peacekeeping forces into the 
country. 
On the other hand, the rejection of the resolution left Turkey out of 
the U.S. war plans and therefore limited its capacity for political maneuver 
in Iraq.  Consequently, Turkey’s so-called red lines faded away as the 
Kurdish tribal leaders made declarations one after the other, claiming the 
control of Mosul and Kirkuk, and rose to the top governmental posts in the 
Iraqi government.162  Meanwhile, as the Iraqi Kurds maintained the control 
of northern Iraq it became harder for Turkey to counter infiltration of the 
Kurdish Worker’s Party (PKK) militants over the border.163  The post-war 
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developments enabled the PKK to consolidate its power in the north of Iraq 
and encouraged it to end its ceasefire in September 2003.164  In this context, 
Turkey’s worst-case scenarios over Iraq and the Kurds seemed to be 
materializing, especially when a federal system in Iraq emerged as the most 
plausible political option rather than just a contingency. 
 These new political realities inevitably eroded the confidence 
between the United States and Turkey.  Particularly, the inability (or for the 
Turks unwillingness) of Washington to initiate operations against the PKK 
militants in the mountains of northern Iraq caused deep resentment among 
the Turks and fueled suspicions that the US was actually punishing Turkey 
for rejecting the opening of the northern front.  To make matters worse, the 
Süleymaniye Incident has dealt a serious blow to the military relations.  The 
US humiliation of the Turkish soldiers by putting sacks over their heads left 
bitter marks in the minds of the Turkish people.  Moreover, the break-out of 
scandals such as the Abu Ghraib and the US military operations against the 
Sunni Iraqis in Talafar and Fallujah drew reactions from the Turkish society 
where a majority of the population consists of Sunni Muslims.  In light of 
these developments, the growing mistrust towards the US intentions and 
strategy over Iraq triggered a rampant anti-Americanism and fed 
nationalism as well as the resurgence of the Sevres syndrome.165  According 
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to a Pew Survey a conducted in 2004 the US favorability ratings in Turkey 
fell from 52% to 30% in four years time.166  In 2005, opinion polls indicated 
that 65% of the Turks viewed the United States as a military threat to their 
security.167   
Retrospectively, the US –Turkish relations have not really been so 
problem-free up till today.  Nor is anti-Americanism a new phenomenon for 
the Turkish society.  Bilateral relations have gone through several ups and 
downs in history as in the case of the Cuban missile crisis, the Johnson 
letter, or the arms embargo after Turkey’s intervention in Cyprus.  Even 
within the Cold War context, anti-American sentiments were embraced by 
either leftist groups or the religious circles in the past for a variety of 
reasons.  However, today Turkish-American relations face a serious 
challenge stemming from the war in Iraq.  Parallel to the global rise of anti-
Americanism in the international arena, the US policies in Iraq and the 
Middle East led to a formation of an opposition block in Turkey that brings 
together various segments within the society.  At the heart/root of the 
problem lies the clash between the US strategy in the Middle East and 
Turkey’s own security dilemmas particularly regarding the future of the 
Kurds and northern Iraq.  Therefore, the starting point of the analysis should 
be the differing perspectives of the United States and Turkey over Iraq since 
the Gulf War which may have been responsible for the predicament of the 
Turkish –American alliance on March 1. 
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The issue of Iraq: Looking through different lenses 
 
Turkey followed a balanced and at times pragmatic foreign policy 
towards Iraq’s Baath regime which came to power after a coup d’etat in 
1968, with the help of the Soviet Union.168  Throughout the Iran – Iraq War 
(1980-1988), Iraq has become a lucrative market for Turkey’s manufactured 
goods.  The combined share of Iran and Iraq in total Turkish exports 
increased from 5.5 percent in 1980 to 26 percent in 1985.169  However, 
during the same period, engagement of the Iraqi troops on the southern 
border created a power vacuum in northern Iraq which paved the way for 
the rise of a Kurdish problem between Iraq and Turkey.170  Starting from 
1983, Turkey occasionally launched cross-border operations against the 
Kurdish militants in Iraq belonging to the Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK).  
Owing to the economic interdependency relations, Iraqi government 
supported Turkey’s cross-border operations to northern Iraq against the 
PKK militants for a while.  However, following the end of the Iran-Iraq war, 
the Saddam regime started to follow a more assertive foreign policy in the 
region.  Bilateral relations gradually soured as the Iraqi government began 
to use the Kurdish issue –particularly the PKK- as a political leverage over 
Turkey by providing support/accommodation for the militant camps in 
northern Iraq.   
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Aside from the Kurdish issue, the two countries were in dispute over 
the flow of waters of Tigris and Euphrates Rivers since Turkey initiated the 
Southeast Anatolia Development Project (GAP) in 1983.171  Especially in 
January 1990, tensions between the countries escalated as a result of 
Turkey’s decision to hold back some of the flowing water for a month in 
order to fill the Atatürk Dam.  Meanwhile, Ankara was worried about the 
increasing military capabilities of Iraq parallel to Saddam Hussein’s 
assertive political discourse in foreign affairs.  As Sami Kohen indicated, in 
the summer of 1990, when Turkish Prime Minister Yildirim Akbulut visited 
Iraq to discuss regional conflicts, Hussein warned Turkey that “NATO was 
dying and that Turkey’s interests were not served by staying in it.”172  
Therefore, it is possible to say that the bilateral relations between Iraq and 
Turkey were already strained before the Gulf crisis erupted.   
Yet, as Meliha Benli Altunışık argues, there was no consensus 
among the Turkish political elites as to what extent Turkey should get 
involved in the crisis.173  Kohen points out that the critics of Turkey’s active 
involvement in the Gulf War on the US side were concerned about 
alienating Iraq as a trading partner and a neighbor.  They were also worried 
about a possible military retaliation from Iraq as well as being concerned 
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about drawing political reaction from the Arab world.  However, despite 
domestic opposition, Turkey supported the US led coalition against Iraq in 
the Gulf War.  Accordingly, Turkey closed the oil pipelines in compliance 
with the UN Resolution 661, allowed the US forces to use Turkish airbases 
for non-NATO operations, and even deployed more than 100.000 Turkish 
troops along the border of Iraq for tactical reasons.174 
Many analysts considered the Turkish-US cooperation during the 
Gulf War as a departure from Turkey’s traditional policy of non-
interference.175  Since the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923, 
Turkish foreign policy in the Middle East rested on the principle of non-
interference in intraregional conflicts.176  Remaining faithful to the Kemalist 
principle of “Peace at home and Peace Abroad,” Turkey tended to follow 
policies in favor of maintaining the status quo in the region and avoided 
active involvement in Middle Eastern affairs.  In fact, Turkey’s political 
position during the Gulf War was shaped by the late President Turgut Özal 
who insistently advocated an active involvement in the Gulf War even 
though this entailed confronting Turkish security and foreign policy 
establishment.  Özal believed that cooperation with the United States against 
Iraq would serve as an opportunity for Turkey to reassure its position and 
role in the Western world given the uncertain environment of the post-Cold 
War.   
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Yet, Turkey’s conservative foreign policy line nonetheless remained 
intact both during and after the Gulf War.  Özal’s active foreign policy 
vision was criticized as political adventurism by Turkish political and 
military elites.  Consequently, the Foreign Minister, the Defense Minister, 
and even the Chief of the General Staff resigned in response to Özal’s 
handling of the Gulf crisis.  What’s more, opposition in the Parliament 
succeeded in blocking Özal’s proposal to dispatch Turkish troops to Iraq.  
Besides, his bold attempts to alter Turkey’s pro-status quo foreign policy 
line, in relation to the Kurdish issue, were met with stiff opposition at home.  
His initiatives to establish a political dialogue with the Iraqi Kurdish tribal 
leaders were abandoned by his political successors soon after his death.177 
Since the Gulf War, Turkey has shaped its foreign policy towards 
Iraq primarily in relation to its own Kurdish problem and thus the political 
status of northern Iraq.178  Turkey’s main concern has been to prevent the 
emergence of an independent Kurdish state in the neighborhood since it 
might inspire the Kurds living in its Southeast Anatolia region to demand 
secession.  In this respect, establishment of free zones in northern Iraq 
through the Operation Provide Comfort (OPC)179 in 1991 was one of the 
most criticized political outcomes of the Turkish-US cooperation in the Gulf 
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War aside from the economic losses of Turkey.  Thus, in a couple years 
following the Gulf War Turkey tried to normalize its relations with Iraq and 
sought for political alternatives that would loosen the economic embargo 
and compensate for its economic losses.  On the other hand, since political 
liberalization of the Iraqi Kurds constituted a threat regarding its own 
domestic security concerns, protecting the territorial integrity of Iraq had 
become a political priority.   
Considering the difficulties of handling a possible ethnic sectarian 
clash in Iraq which might end up in total disintegration of the country, 
Turkey did not welcome the US war plans to topple Saddam Hussein.  The 
first signals of an alteration in the US foreign policy towards Iraq came in 
the second term of the Clinton administration as the possibility of a regime 
change was ever more frequently mentioned.  The US government came to 
realize that the UN economic sanctions had a contradictory result of 
impoverishing the ordinary Iraqis and strengthening Saddam Hussein’s 
oppressive rule.180  Therefore, in 1998, the US Congress passed a law, 
which authorized up to $97 million in military assistance to Iraqi opposition 
forces “to remove the regime headed by Saddam Hussein” and “promote the 
emergence of a democratic government.”181  Towards the end of the same 
year, Washington decided to launch its Operation Desert Fox since 
                                                
180
 “Clinton remarks to the Arab World”  (December 18, 1998), available at:  
http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/clinarab.htm ^ | 18 Dec 1998 | The White House. 
For Madeline Albright’s statement about a regime change in Iraq, on December 16, 1998, available at: 
http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/news/830743/posts 
See the remarks by Secretary of State Madeline K. Albright on Airstrikes against Iraq,  available at: 
http://www.meij.or.jp/text/Gulf%20War/1998121602.htm 
181
 See, “Iraq Liberation Act of 1998,” available at:  
http://www.iraqwatch.org/government/US/Legislation/ILA.htm; See also, Bob Woodward, Plan of Attack 
(London: Simon & Schuster, 2004): 10. 
  87 
diplomatic pressures on Iraq failed to provide Iraq’s cooperation with the 
UN weapons inspectors.  
As evident in Murat Yetkin’s analysis of a dialogue between the then 
President Süleyman Demirel and the US Secretary of Defense William 
Cohen in 1998, Turkey considered a U.S.-led military operation in Iraq as a 
misguided and perilous policy, which might shatter the present balance of 
power in the region.182 When the Bush administration targeted the Saddam 
regime as their next destination in the war against terrorism, Turkey once 
again had to face the inevitable question of how to reconcile the conflicting 
interests of preserving the territorial integrity of Iraq and overthrowing a 
dictatorship desired by its most powerful ally.  Since Ankara was concerned 
of a possible spillover effect of developments in northern Iraq, preserving 
the territorial integrity constituted a higher political priority than the 
democratic nature of the Iraqi regime.183 
Diplomatic Traffic Begins 
The Bush administration’s mission was almost shaped by early 2002.  
The U.S. intention to start a military campaign in Iraq was first mentioned to 
the Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit during his visit to Washington in January 
2002.  As Fikret Bila observed, in Washington, Ecevit tried to explain to the 
US officials Turkey’s concerns about a possible military operation which 
might destroy the territorial integrity of Iraq and later reiterated his case 
when Dick Cheney came to Ankara in March 2002, as part of his Middle 
Eastern tour.   
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The Ecevit government was reluctant to get involved in a military 
operation in Iraq because of political, economic reasons.  Recovering from 
one of the worst financial crisis in Turkish history, a war in the 
neighborhood was the last thing the government wanted, considering its 
possible impact on the revenues from trade and tourism.  However, Ecevit 
was also aware that the Bush administration was determined to change the 
Saddam regime and thus Turkey did not have the power to prevent the US 
from attacking Iraq184.  As Bila points out, in case of an attack, Turkey did 
not want to stay outside the operation and watch the establishment of an 
independent Kurdistan.  Such a development was considered a casus belli 
by both the government and the Turkish military staff.185   
Throughout 2002, the issue of Iraq was placed on the top of the 
agenda of Turkish- American relations.  However, due to the instability of 
Turkish domestic politics arising from the illness of Prime Minister Ecevit 
and the internal struggles within the government, the US officials were 
unable to find a counterpart to set up a healthy dialogue and proceed with 
their plans over Iraq.  It was exactly the situation Deputy Secretary of 
Defense Paul Wolfowitz faced when he came to Istanbul in the middle of 
July to participate in a conference organized by TESEV-a Turkish think 
tank.186The Deputy Prime Minister Hüsamettin Özkan’s resignation on July 
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8 which triggered other resignations from the Democratic Left Party (DSP), 
was followed by the Turkish Foreign Minister İsmail Cem’s (also from  the 
DSP) decision on July 11 to set up his own political party.187  When 
Wolfowitz later on, went to Ankara to discuss Turkey’s possible 
role/cooperation in the war against Iraq, the coalition government’s 
credibility was already on a freefall and a date was called by one of the 
coalition partners for early elections as November 3, 2002.188   
Yet, the US side needed to concretize their demands of full 
cooperation from Turkey in the Iraq war as soon as possible.  Therefore, the 
diplomatic traffic continued increasingly through military channels.  In 
September 2002, before Assistant Secretary of State Elizabeth Jones’s visit 
to Ankara189, the US officials from the Office of Defense Cooperation 
(ODC) sent a message to the deputy Chief of Staff, General Yaşar 
Büyükanıt through the European Command (EUCOM).  According to the 
message, the US demands from Turkey included the following: 
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• Opening of a “Northern Front” on Turkish soil for the use of the 
US forces in the military operation against Iraq 
• Allowing the deployment of US land forces-80.000 U.S. soldiers 
in total- and 250 U.S. warplanes.  
• Opening of airports and seaports to the use of United States and to 
the US-led Coalition forces including Adana-İncirlik, İstanbul-Sabiha 
Gökçen, Batman, Antalya, Diyarbakır, Gaziantep, Balıkesir, Erzurum, 
Erzincan, Muş, İzmir-Çiğli, Konya, Malatya airports; İskenderun, Mersin, 
Samsun, Trabzon and İzmir seaports. 
• Allowing the United States to initiate a modernization process 
which aimed to reconstruct and renovate the existing airbases and seaports 
to meet the U.S. standards for military operation 
In fact, the authority to allow the deployment of foreign troops in 
Turkey belonged to the Turkish Grand National Assembly not to the Chief 
of the General Staff.  However, Washington preferred to communicate 
directly with the Turkish military bureaucracy before discussing the details 
of cooperation with the Ecevit government.  It is possible to interpret this 
exchange of messages at the military level as a US attempt to bypass the 
civilian government which openly expressed its opposition to get involved 
in any kind of military operation against Iraq.  With the Justice and 
Development Party’s (AKP) coming to power in November, not only the 
political uncertainty in Turkish domestic politics would disappear but also 
the bargaining and compromise between the United States and Turkey 
would gain momentum. 
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The AKP on the scene 
After over a decade of coalition governments, the AKP emerged as 
the winner of November 3 elections, strong enough to form a one-party 
government.190  Although the party owed its victory to its westward looking 
and moderate image, the fact that it came from the Islamist tradition led 
many people in Turkey to doubt the sincerity of the party’s democratic and 
secular orientation.191  However, since the beginning, Recep Tayyip 
Erdoğan as the AKP leader strongly rejected any kind of Islamist labeling 
on his party, and described his party’s vision as conservative, democratic, 
and committed to secularism.192   
At first glance, it seemed less likely for Washington to receive 
cooperation from the AKP over Iraq, considering the reaction of the party’s 
conservative base to an attack against a Muslim state.  However, the AKP 
government appeared to be relatively responsive towards the US demands, 
especially when compared to the Ecevit government.  As Henry Barkey and 
Philip Gordon claimed, for the AKP the war in Iraq in a way provided a 
means to establish dialogue with the Bush administration.193  In other words, 
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facilitating the US action on Iraq might help the new and inexperienced 
government to win Washington’s trust and support, which in return would 
boast the AKP’s prestige at both domestic and international levels.194  It is 
therefore significant that a week after the new government secured a vote of 
confidence in the Parliament; Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz 
came to Ankara on December 3, 2002 to discuss the US agenda of 
cooperation with Turkey.   
According to Murat Yetkin, Wolfowitz was demanding from Prime 
Minister Abdullah Gül to get an authorization for the US team of engineers 
and technicians to initiate site surveys in the Turkish military bases.  In 
return, he was giving reassurances to Turkey in terms of protecting the 
territorial integrity of Iraq which meant that they were not in favor of an 
independent Kurdish state in the north.  As Yetkin points out, the 
permission for the site surveys were regarded as a positive signal from the 
government, although, Prime Minister Gül stressed that giving authorization 
for the site surveys would not mean an automatic consent for taking part in 
the further steps of the US war preparations.  Yet, Wolfowitz told the press 
before leaving that the United States would spend huge amounts on the 
modernization of Turkish military bases; therefore it was necessary to 
clarify the limits of cooperation with Turkey as soon as possible.195  
According to Yetkin, this was an implicit warning to the Turkish side that, if 
they were not in favor of supporting the US to the end, they should not let 
them to go in for the investment in the first place. 
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On another front in Ankara, the government officials were giving out 
confusing messages over the state of cooperation between the United States 
and Turkey against Iraq.  After the Turkish Foreign Minister Yaşar Yakış 
met with Wolfowitz, he stated to the press that they did not desire a war in 
the neighborhood; yet, if a military operation became inevitable, they would 
allow the US forces to use Turkish airspace as well as military bases.196  The 
remarks of the Foreign Minister led to a virtual panic among the Turkish 
military and political elites, because there was no consensus over the Iraqi 
issue yet; and  Yakış was promising unconditional support for the United 
States without taking advise from the Foreign Ministry.  The Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs immediately made a declaration correcting Foreign Minister 
Yakış197, however, the public statements of the Foreign Minister were 
perceived by the US side as a green light for future cooperation against 
Iraq.198   
In the evening of the same day, Paul Wolfowitz, the US ambassador 
Robert Pearson, the Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs, Marc 
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Grossman, and a US official from the Pentagon had dinner with the AKP 
leader Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, and his advisors, Cüneyd Zapsu and Ömer 
Çelik.  As the content of this private meeting was later publicized by 
Stephen Hayes from the Weekly Standard and then by Ertuğrul Özkok from 
Hürriyet daily,  the agenda of cooperation was presumed to be set during 
this unofficial dinner.  Accordingly, the US side expected the Turkish 
General Staff to give a briefing to the Turkish government on the US war 
plans on December 9 and by the late December the conduct of site surveys 
would be completed so that the United States would start construction 
within the scope of modernization of the Turkish military bases.199  It is 
noteworthy that on such a vital issue the United States was trying to secure 
cooperation through back-stage diplomacy as it is obvious that the 
representatives of the Turkish side had no official titles vis-à-vis their 
American counterparts, except for Ömer Çelik being MP from Adana.  
Another point which deserves attention is that, during this private dinner, 
Erdoğan was claimed to have received an invitation to the White 
House.200Before the Copenhagen Summit, the US support would strengthen 
Turkey’s hand as well as the AKP who was struggling to get a date for the 
start of negotiations with the EU.201 
On December 10, 2002, Erdoğan went to Washington.  He was 
welcomed at the White House even though he had no official title to 
represent Turkey other than being the leader of the governing party -he was 
not even elected to the Parliament yet.  It was alleged that during this visit, 
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President George W. Bush reached an agreement with Erdoğan on the 
outlines of the US-Turkish cooperation in the Iraq War.202  However, later 
on, Erdoğan told the press that they did not get into the details of a military 
operation during the meeting, but he got the impression from the US side 
that a military option in Iraq seemed likely in the near future.203  Following 
the White House meeting, the diplomatic bargaining between the US and 
Turkey intensified.  Towards the end of December, the two countries set up 
their delegations and started negotiations to settle the details of cooperation 
over Iraq. 
On his way back to Turkey, Erdoğan gave hints about the bargaining 
axis that would define the negotiations in the next two months between 
Turkey and the United States in Iraq.  He stated that Turkey would be hurt 
by a possible military operation in Iraq whether it participates in the 
operation or stays outside.  Therefore, the main question should be how to 
reduce the loss of Turkey in case of a war in Iraq.  In this respect, he pointed 
at the economic difficulties Turkey faced after the Gulf War as well as the 
future of northern Iraq.  As the delegations started working, these two topics 
determined the course of negotiations. 
 
Negotiation Process 
The negotiation process constituted one of the turbulent periods 
between the United States and Turkey towards the March 1.  The previous 
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statements of the Turkish political elites which seemed to have encouraged 
the Bush administration did not result in a firm commitment for immediate 
political action.  Parallel to the anti-war movements in the international 
arena, Turkish public opinion started to put pressure on the Turkish 
government not to take part in a war which lacked legitimacy.  On 
December 26, 2002, the Human Rights Commission of the Turkish Grand 
National Assembly issued a declaration which indicated that they were 
opposed to Turkey’s involvement in Iraq War as well as Turkey’s opening 
of a Northern Front.204This was followed by anti-war public demonstrations 
from all across the country.  On the other hand, the Bush administration was 
already behind its schedule in terms of war preparations.  The site surveys 
which were planned to be completed by the end of December, 2002; finally 
started on 13th of January, 2003 due to the delays in the Turkish decision 
making process.  The meticulousness of the Turkish delegation- its 
examining of every detail within the scope of cooperation- complicated 
moving ahead in the negotiations, thus created a disappointment over the 
US side.  In this context, discussions between the head of delegations turned 
into tactical wars as the US deadline for the Iraqi operation drew near.  
The bargaining process involved political, military, and financial 
dimensions which the delegations carried out simultaneously.  At the 
political level, the most contentious issue was the control of northern Iraq, 
both during and after the operation.  The fact that the US side lacked 
concrete plans for the post-war Iraq increased Turkey’s concerns over the 
dissolution of the country and establishment of an independent Kurdistan 
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that included the rich oil fields of Mosul and Kirkuk.205  While, the United 
States tried to convince the Turkish side that they would support the 
territorial integrity of Iraq, declarations from the Iraqi opposition groups 
were indicating that the post-war constitutional arrangements might give 
way to a federal political establishment.206Therefore, the Turkish military 
wanted to enter northern Iraq along with the US forces so that they would be 
able to check the presence of the PKK in the region while, on the other 
hand, prevent empowerment of the Iraqi Kurds at the expense of 
Turcomans207-a Turkic speaking ethnic minority- living in Mosul and 
Kirkuk.   
At the military level, the two sides had difficulty in reaching an 
agreement over the details of the combat such as the command of the 
Turkish military forces, the law by which the US military would abide on 
Turkish soil and the like.  Particularly, the negotiations came to a breaking 
point because Turkey opposed to the US supply of weapons to the Iraqi 
Kurds.  As Fikret Bila pointed out, the United States was preparing to send 
anti-aircraft artillery to Iraqi Kurds as a part of building an army of 
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opposition against Saddam.208  However, it was not clear against whom this 
heavy weaponry would be used since there was a no-fly zone, established 
over the 36th parallel years ago.  In this respect, Turkey appeared to be the 
only target.  In addition to this, the United States was avoiding to set a date 
for collecting these heavy weapons back from the Iraqi Kurds.  Besides, the 
US side was trying to limit the capabilities of the Turkish military in 
northern Iraq.  The US delegation was suggesting limits on opening fire in 
northern Iraq except for acts of self-defense.  This was another issue which 
the Turkish delegation strongly objected to since it meant that in case of 
confrontation with the PKK groups in northern Iraq, the Turkish military 
had to wait for the PKK   to attack them first in order to respond.   
Throughout the negotiations, the slow pace of the Turkish decision 
making process was perceived by the US side as an attempt to raise the sum 
of financial package in the bargaining.  In fact, Turkey still carried 
unpleasant memories from the Gulf War.  The disappointment due to feeling 
financially undercompensated in the aftermath of the Gulf War led the 
Turkish delegations to get solid assurances from the US side in terms of 
material support.  However, it is also true that by setting a high limit, the 
Turkish government relied on Turkey’s strategic indispensability to the 
United States in the Iraq War.  The US decision to dispatch its warships to 
the Mediterranean as the bargaining continued, convinced the Turkish 
political elites that the United States could not initiate the operation without 
Turkey’s support.  As Mustafa Balbay claimed, Turkish political elites 
determined the amount they would ask from the US administration 
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according to the estimated cost of the “Northern Front” to the US 
military.209  In this respect, the Turkish side was demanding from the United 
States an economic package worth $28 billon including donations and 
credits.  In addition, Turkey was asking from the Bush administration to get 
a Congressional approval for the economic agreement.  However, the United 
States was offering Turkey $6 billion in donation or four to five times that 
amount in loans.210  Furthermore, the Bush administration regarded the 
future projections of the Turkish side-illustrating their economic losses in 
the next five years as $80 billion - as unrealistic. 
Turkey’s insistent position in determining the amount of the 
economic compensation package led to a misunderstanding that the 
economic deadlock was the chief obstacle between the delegations.  The 
remarks by President Bush likening negotiations to a “horse trading” as well 
as the offensive cartons in the American press, depicting Turkey as a belly 
dancer over the negotiation table with dollars over her body drew reactions 
from the Turkish public opinion and complicated the efforts of the 
delegations in reaching a conclusion.  The focus on the economic aspect of 
the negotiations also led to a discontent among the Turkish military staff.  
Therefore, a senior military official told Fikret Bila, following the National 
Security Council meeting on December 29, 2002: “The Turkish Military is 
not a mercenary force.  The Turkish Military would serve to protect Turkish 
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national interests whether the United States compensates Turkey’s 
economic losses or not.” 211  
On March 1, the news reached to Ankara that Turkey and the United 
States finally agreed on a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) which set 
the details of the military operation in Iraq.  The same day, the Turkish 
Parliament accepted the proposal which would provide the deployment of 
the foreign troops in Turkey, with a slim margin of 3 votes.  However, due 
to a technicality the motion failed to pass.  The months-long discussions 
were wasted.  The agreement would not enter into force because the 
resolution failed to pass.  When Fikret Bila later published the document of 
the MOU, it was understood that the Turkish delegation succeeded in 
getting concrete guarantees from the US side with regard to the most 
sensitive issues.  Then why did the resolution fail when Turkey seemed to 
have secured its interests? 
 
Analysis of Turkey’s Decision on March 1 
 
In retrospect, Turkey was opposed to the war in Iraq from the 
beginning.  The liberals tended to see the war as illegitimate and unjust; the 
conservative and religious groups regarded the war as an attack against a 
Muslim state by a non-Muslim country.212  As for the nationalists, the Iraq 
war would open Pandora’s Box with respect to the Kurdish problem.  With 
the dissolution of Iraq, ethnic sectarian struggles could pave the way for an 
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CONCLUSION 
From a historical perspective, March 1 was a turning point in 
Turkish-American relations.  However, the crisis it engendered was not 
unprecedented as Turkey and the United States experienced similar crises in 
the past, too.  Yet, during the Cold War, common security concerns 
prevented their conflicting interests going to the fore and damaging the 
alliance ties.  Following the end of the Cold War, the emergence of multiple 
areas for cooperation enabled cordial relations between Turkey and the 
United States to evolve into a “strategic partnership.”  A pivotal role was 
attributed to Turkey for its assistance to the United States in confronting the 
regional challenges of the period.   
However, the concept of strategic partnership led to a 
misunderstanding as if the political priorities of Turkey and the United 
States were entirely congruent.  In fact, throughout the 1990s, policy 
divergences between the allies continued on several issues, such as Cyprus, 
human rights, and arms transfers.  Particularly, in the aftermath of the Gulf 
War, Turkey had difficulties in tolerating the US policies on Iraq.  The 
economic sanctions against Iraq caused disruptions for the Turkish 
economy.  On the other hand, the controversial aspects of Operation Provide 
Comfort (OPC) caused a stir in Turkish-American relations.  A majority of 
the Turks believed that creation of safe havens in northern Iraq paved the 
way for the Iraqi Kurds to politically institutionalize.  Moreover, the power 
vacuum in this autonomous zone was believed to encourage the PKK’s 
activities.  Therefore, the renewal of the OPC’s mandate has been a 
contentious issue in Turkish domestic politics due to the growing mistrust 
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and resentment against the US enforcement of the no-fly zone in northern 
Iraq.  Yet, the political and economic instability of the 1990s prevented 
Turkey from alienating the United States.  Turkey could not risk a political 
isolation by losing the US support, especially when the doors of the 
European Union remained at best half open.   
The terrorist attacks of September 11 led to profound changes in the 
US foreign policy making, by altering threat perceptions of the Americans. 
Following the attacks, the United States immediately declared a “war on 
terrorism.”  However, fighting global terrorism involved a battle of ideas as 
well as a battle of arms.  While trying to overcome the shock of September 
11, the US policymakers tried to understand the reasons which inclined “a 
group of middle-class and reasonably well-educated Middle Easterners to 
fly three airplanes into buildings and another into the ground.”225  
Eventually, they had come to a conclusion that the absence of democracy 
and representative institutions was fostering religious radicalism.  From this 
perspective, oppressive regimes in the Middle East appeared as the root 
cause of terrorism.  Therefore, the Bush administration undertook a broader 
task of promoting democracy in the Middle East.   
The change in the US foreign policy thinking elevated Turkey’s 
strategic importance beyond its geo-strategic value, as a democratic, secular, 
and Muslim country.  However, at the same time, the US policies following 
September 11 touched upon one of Turkey’s identity problems which the 
Turkish policymakers were avoiding to face for decades, i.e. the secularist-
Islamist tension.  Being promoted as a moderate Islamic country drew 
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criticism both from religious and secular segments in the Turkish society.  
On the other hand, the US transformative policies in the Middle East which 
entailed a reshaping of Turkey’s neighborhood worried a pro-status quo 
power like Turkey.  Particularly, the US decision to go for a regime change 
in Iraq exacerbated Turkey’s fears of an establishment of a Kurdistan in 
northern Iraq.   
Shaping its foreign policy towards Iraq through the lens of its 
Kurdish problem, Turkey failed to realize that the Iraq War was just a phase 
in the US revolutionary project.  Turkey’s focusing on northern Iraq limited 
the scope of cooperation between Turkey and the United States in the Iraq 
War.  This even prevented the allies from developing a common agenda on 
the political stabilization and democratization of post-war Iraq.  March 1 
indeed highlighted this policy divergence between Turkey and the United 
States over Iraq which had its roots in the Gulf War.  By underlining limits 
of cooperation between Turkey and the United States, March 1 unearthed 
the truth about their conflicting strategic priorities over regional issues and 
thus marked the end of strategic partnership. 
From many aspects March 1 will be regarded as a reference point in 
the history of Turkish-American relations.  Considering the conflicting of 
strategic priorities of Turkey and the United States, the relations were prone 
to living such a crisis on March 1 at any time since the Bush administration 
decided to topple Saddam Hussein.  Yet, the impact of March 1 could have 
been limited if the AKP government could give an outright negative 
response to Washington’s demands rather than postponing what in 
retrospect can be considered an inevitable outcome to the end of negotiation 
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process.  Turkey’s disapproval of the deployment of the US troops at the 
last moment, while the US logistic equipments waited on board in the 
Mediterranean Sea, certainly caused a feeling of betrayal on the US side.  
The risk of alienating the United States prevented the AKP 
government from spelling out the real opposition (within their parliamentary 
group).  The government chose to go though bargaining with the United 
States while on the other hand, sought for ways to prevent the war.  This 
ambivalent position, however, sent mixed messages to Washington.  
Especially, the Parliament’s approval of the first motion on the 
modernization of bases encouraged the US policy makers to think that the 
AKP government was on their side.  Therefore, when the second motion 
failed in the Parliament, it was at first, regarded as a technical mishandling 
of the voting process due to the AKP’s political inexperience.  In fact, the 
AKP did not want to carry the burden of decision of war.  That was the 
reason which drove the AKP to postpone the voting in the Parliament after 
the National Security Council (NSC) declarations from the Turkish General 
Staff.  Such political maneuvers provided political relief for the AKP as the 
Parliament turned down the motion.  However, the AKP’s efforts to refrain 
from taking full responsibility in the March 1 crises damaged the relations 
between the Turkish Military and the Pentagon in the long term.  
The Parliament’s decision surprised the US policy makers who had 
relied on their ties with the political elites, worked through informal and 
unauthoritative channels, and disregarded the voice of public opinion.  
When looked closely, Turkey’s unwillingness to get involved in a military 
operation against Iraq was obvious.  The public demonstrations across the 
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country as well as the results of the opinion polls reflected this truth.  In this 
respect, the failure of the resolution on March 1 confirmed that the foreign 
policy issues were not in the monopoly of the Turkish political elites and 
that the public opinion has become an important source of pressure in the 
Turkish foreign policy making. 
The March 1 incident and the challenges of Iraq War cast a shadow 
over Turkish-American relations.  The Middle East, particularly Iraq 
appears as a problematic area to build partnership.  Yet, there are a variety 
of issues which necessitate US-Turkish cooperation such as global 
terrorism, nuclear proliferation, the energy security, stabilization of the 
Caucasus and the Black Sea, and Afghanistan.  With respect to the enduring 
alliance ties, the United States and Turkey will find it easier to work 
together addressing these challenges.  In order to overcome what has 
happened on March 1 and restore a healthy dialogue, both countries should 
develop a common agenda based on shared interests.  By concentrating less 
on the policy divergences, and more on common interests, each of the two 
countries were to benefit from cooperation in the long term. 
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